Nationalism and Power

(An analysis of nationalism from the perspective of the positive concept of power)

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Introduction

Phenomenon of nationalism is a complex one. Many attempts have been made to conceptualise it and to understand its workings, its effects and its inner logic. Historically it was placed at the end of 18th century. Its emergence has been set in connection with the rise of capitalism and industrial revolution, and the French Revolution marked its historical birth. This is also the point where Foucault places the beginning of the decisive shift in the concept of power. Decay of monarchy and rise of new social classes in Europe called for new forms of government, which meant a new and different use of power. Power changed from negative (**prohibitive**) to positive (**creative**). It was no longer a prerogative of the ruler (sovereign), constituting the relation between rulers and the ruled. It was seen as a capacity of developing strategies and techniques for controlling and guiding a process of formation of power-alliances within society. One such strategy, arisen from practical concerns, was nationalism. Thus, it seems that the rise of nationalism cannot be dissociated from the reconceptualisation of power and to understand the one requires understanding the other.

As it will be shown, reconceptualisation of power entailed new understanding of governmentality and sovereignty. This led Foucault to give perhaps central place to the concept of biopolitics, comprising new meaning of related concepts of population and power-technique. Put together these concepts constitute the apparatus employed by Foucault in his analysis of political reality and political phenomena from 17th century onwards. Before starting, few clarifications may prove helpful.

Firstly, Foucault's approach to issue of power has a form of genealogical analysis. Interpretation of history serves to elucidate the change in the meaning of the concept of power and consequently in the use of power. The power is conceived as essentially relational. Its domain is interaction of free agents – basic power-relations - which serves as the point of departure for working out analytic of power.

Secondly, Foucault's method is multi-dimensional. It can be rendered as a phenomenological reduction, in that he wants to free himself from the burden of the theoretical heritage. He dismisses at the outset any theoretical preconception, which may force itself upon the experience. Likewise, he dismisses a deductive procedure starting from the concept of power (power as it is commonly understood), which after identifying what is essential to it, tries in the end to deduce the instances of power. He

advocates instead a direct approach to the historical facts, where the resulting theoretical concepts (explanatory principle) ought to be shaped by these same facts. His method might therefore be regarded as species of phenomenological interpretation bordering to a purely empirical investigation. Assuming that a direct access to historical facts is possible, the task is then to try to extract the exact meaning of the theoretical concepts, which both features and regulates the understanding of history. This also means that there is no point of view from outside of history, and that the explanatory principle is to be found in the history itself. This implies that Foucault's method is a hermeneutical interpretation of the events from within the events. Consequently, the principle of intelligibility is located in the events

In any case, his approach led to the reconceptualisation of power. A new concept of power offered a comprehensive explanation of historical phenomena, establishing a connection to contemporary political theory and practices of government.

One of these phenomena is nationalism. The last decade of 20th century witnessed a violent outbreak of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe on the ruins of a stillborn project of "supra-national" proletarian unity. This undermined the modernists' thesis, which asserts the primordiality of civic nationalism and all too easily relegates ethnic nationalism to a deviant form. I will argue that a notion of power as articulated in Foucault opens a possibility of an analysis, which by penetrating deeply into micro-level of social structure explains the formation of atoms of not only ethnic nationalism, but of nationalism in general. This might be called power-based theory of nationalism.

The study is composed of two parts. In the first part I will attempt to lay out in details Foucault's theoretical apparatus centering on power. The central source is Foucault's *History of Sexuality*. In the second part, I will show how the apparatus can be used in analysis of nationalism drawing on the works of Foucault, Anderson, Gellner and A. Marx. Power-based theory of nationalism will also be discussed against the backdrop of political views of Schmitt and Agamben.

Part one

Conception of power in Foucault

In his essay *History of Sexuality* Foucault undertook a historical analysis of sexuality, but as he himself latter said, the aim of the essay was not to describe sexual practices, or different roles and significations of sexuality depending on demographic, social, racial and historical factors. The main issue is the elucidation of the notion of power and the change in understanding, practices and uses of power. The analysis is an attempt to capture "behaviour" of power in a social and political context, its works and the manner in which it is exercised and used.

The form of Foucault's argument is *reductio ad absurdum*. He put the *repressive hypothesis* to the test, and then proceeded with investigating whether it correctly depicts historical facts. Since, as we shall se, it turns out that it does not, the contradiction emerges, and Foucault not only discards the hypothesis, but more importantly tries to uncover motives behind the hypothesis in order to locate its fallacy. He concludes that the reason why sexuality has been described in terms of repressive policies is due to the understanding of power in terms of repression. The solution lies in rethinking the concept of power, which makes it possible to view historical changes in the domain of the social and the political as the result of different use of power. Let me present the steps of the argument, a conclusion drawn at the end and its implications.

The Repressive Hypothesis

The repressive hypothesis purports to describe practices of suppressing sexuality from early 17th century and onward, paralleling origination of bourgeois society and emergence of capitalism. The suppression of sexuality had already been well-established practice of Church since the Middle Ages. But the repressive hypothesis by connecting this theologico-moralistic background of repression with the rise of liberalism and capitalistic ways of production, adds to the claim that since the 17th century motivation behind the repressive policy was a concern for the waste of energy of the worker, which caused the decline in the profit.

According to the hypothesis, the repressive practices were twofold. On one side, they consisted in purging language from numerous direct references to sexuality by establishing a "proper" way of talking about it. Such praxis was imposed on social relations in different social segments - family, school, etc. On the other side, while all public talking about sex was suppressed and almost extinct, the authorities (Church, pastoral) spared no efforts in inciting detailed and comprehensive confessions about sexuality – about the sin of flesh. People's feelings could thus be monitored, shaped and controlled. The suppression of sexuality and incitement to talk about it had a double effect: *discourse on sexuality was augmented and monopolised by power institutions*. This intrusion on the side of authorities into the private space radically extended institutionalised power of Church.

What takes place at the end of 17th century is something that might be rendered *secularised turn* in augmenting and controlling sexuality. Unitary discourse concerned with theological ethic and good Christian breeding was substituted for diversity of specified discourses on sexuality, each treating the subject from its own perspective with its own specific goals – medicine, demography, economy, education, law etc. The reason for continued use of confessional practice in the 18th century was that, as a well-established power-technique and effective means of control, authorities recognised its potential for the solidification of power suitable for the new emerging context of capitalist production. Two things marked this turn - *dispersal* and *multiplication* of discourses on sexuality, and postulating the *truth of sexuality*.

Claim that sexuality contains the truth becomes evident when contrasted with an understanding of sexuality as a particular bodily experience. Foucault illustrates the point by invoking the distinction between science of sex and art of sex. The art of sex focuses on sexuality as a sensual experience that can be mastered in order to intensify the pleasure. Its truth, provided it has one, does not exist outside the experience. Likewise, sexuality as an essentially aesthetic experience cannot have significance beyond the pleasure-context.

To say that sexuality contains the truth is at the same time to assume that the truth of sexuality has social and political importance. Biology and psychology were linked through sexuality and when combined, these two could profoundly affect society, affecting its ability to monopolise the political. People's conduct depends on what type of people they are, and this was assumed to be determined by sexuality – by how they

relate to their sexuality, what progeny is desirable or normal etc. Hence, what was needed were reliable methods for accessing the truth of sexuality – *scientia sexualis*[i].

The method already available was confession. It was introduced by Church in the Middle Ages and became a constitutive part of every truth-seeking endeavour. Confession was a means of producing the truth by uncovering of the hidden depths of the soul and body, a public and private avowal of one's thoughts and emotions. In addition to its epistemological quality (unquestioned at the time), it established itself as an essential part of legislation. The avowal received the legal status of truth.

"Scientification" of sexuality led to overtaking of the confession from Church by secular institutions – hospitals, schools, army, etc. They adapted it, expanded the filed of its application and modified their methods accordingly. Foucault reeled off five procedures through which confession became part of the *will to truth* regarding sex and an indivisible part of scientific apparatus. These are: questioning techniques, postulate of general causality (everything is caused by sex), principle of latency (object of examination, sex, is hidden, omnipresent under surface), rule of interpretation of the confessed content (nothing is to be taken at face value), imperative of medicalization (sexual domain is to be accounted for in pathological terms and not only in moralistic or religious, which entails necessity of diagnosis and treatment)[ii].

With regard to the *dispersal and multiplication of discourse on sex*, Foucault speaks of a number of centres where sexuality was an agenda on daily bases. Since concern with the sexuality included child's sexuality, educational centres assumed the task of monitoring and shaping it. A whole range of daily activities in schools, the content of education and the rules of conduct reflected sexual awareness. Other centres included medical institutions and various governmental agencies dealing explicitly with the same problem, albeit on the more general level. Sexuality and sexual behaviour have been observed, analysed, classified, their causes localised, they were discussed among experts and among all those who were involved in this expanding discourse. *Whether in form of a subtle confession in confidence or an authoritative interrogation sex...had to be put in words* [iii]. This led to the intensification and broadening of the sexual discourse.

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[i] *The History of Sexuality*" p. 51; Michel Foucault
[ii] *The History of Sexuality*" p. 65; Michel Foucault
[iii] *The History of Sexuality*" p. 32; Michel Foucault

This development had somewhat paradoxical consequences – an increase of perversion. In the comprehensive study of sexuality, nothing was to be dismissed straight away. Uncovering the truth of sex thus included branching and detailing different types of deviant sexual behaviour – perversions. Thus, perverts were not simply immoral lawbreakers that ought to be persecuted, but the subjects of care and scientific scrutiny. This was not the case of Victorian hypocrisy - society let its desires have free space under cover of the alleged scientific concern serving public interests. The increase in the production of perversion was a direct consequence of the institutionalisation of perversion by assigning it the status of an object of scientific investigation. Both aspects – the truth of sexuality and proliferation of the discourse on sexuality – were grounded in sex-polity, whose concern was well-being of the society.

Inadequacy of the Repressive hypothesis and the attempt to reinterpret it

The repressive hypothesis claims that these different but closely connected developments – truth of sexuality, expansion of the role of confession in the search for this truth, proliferation of the discourse on sexuality, multiplication of perversion, institutionalisation of the discourse on sexuality - can be explained in terms of the repressive politics exercised from centres of political power. It claims that the repressive practices and policies were exercised at all levels and at all locations. However, the hypothesis seems to be too weak to account for the paradoxical situation that repression created more of what is repressed. The question is then how could the repressive practices bring about an explosion of sexuality in the terms of its discursive ubiquity on levels ranging from common chitchat to scientific, educational and political debates?

One could perhaps try to rescue it by interpreting the multiplication of discourse and search for the truth of sexuality as a sort of side effect of the politics, which at bottom was repressive. Foucault himself suggested this strategy when criticising sincerity of the endeavour to uncover the truth of sex. He questions whether the efforts made by psychiatrists and doctors were genuinely scientific. Mapping down details of sexuality and focusing on oddities had the effect of inducing fears and abhorrence of anything that defies prescribed picture of healthy marital relation – sex's procreative function. This is indicated, writes Foucault, by observing *disparity* between genuine scientific investigation into the *biological mechanism of reproduction*

(including plants and animals) and *medicine of sex*. The relation was strangely weak, with the medicine of sex only exploiting the language and the results of the first in order to appear scientific and grounded in truth. *...a blanket guarantee under cover of which moral obstacles, economic or political option, traditional fears could be recast in a scientific sounding vocabulary[i]*. Hence, even "science of sex", writes Foucault, remained stuck in moralistic perspectives distinguishing right from wrong sexuality, albeit on seemingly different grounds. It appears that the main objective was deterring from deviant behaviour, which was the continuation of the repressive policy.

However, this will not do despite the fact that it is true to a considerable extent. Although it is true that science of sex could not rid itself from the grip of moralistic prejudice, it does not mean that either moralists or priests had the final word in the production of the truth of sex. Even less, could they direct and modify scientific praxis to serve their political purposes. The explanation in terms of concealed power – moralistic reproach and deterrence in disguise of science – is not only unconvincing, but more importantly, it is premised on the problematic concept of power.

Foucault's main reason for distrusting an explanatory power of the repressive hypothesis is precisely its suggestion that everything surrounding the discourse on sexuality was conducted from centres of power. This picture of power being exercised from the top is exactly what Foucault dismisses as a common misconception. Such picture fails to comprise subtle mechanism of power and the phenomena connected to its use. It fails to account for the number of transformations of various social categories as well as shifts in their positions in relation to each other.

For instance, it fails to see the transformation of the status of the pervert from the lawbreaker to the patient, while psychiatrist and teachers assumed the role close to that of police (surveillance perhaps). It also fails to see how different legal status of perverts became a virtual legitimising stance for the power practices. In the chapter entitled *Perverse Implantation* Foucault concludes that a great variety of scientific (psychological, psychiatric, social) ways of classifying deviant sexual behaviour - juridical means in dealing with it included - bear witness more to the fact that power mechanisms were more interested in sustaining themselves through this practice, than in eradicating deviant behaviour as potentially harmful for the population.

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[i] *The History of Sexuality"* p. 55; Michel Foucault

These were nothing but power-relations establishing themselves in and through a new field of domination. Problematized sexuality, which was assumed to be all-important (the cause of everything concerning human behaviour), served as a medium through which previously established positions of domination became partially dissolved and transformed into new power-positions, resting on new power-alliances. In other words, what takes place is re-aligning of powers within society, which is in part dictated by the interests and oppositions interacting through a certain medium – in this case, the medium was sexuality. The simple schema of *bi-polar* one-way workings of power fails to capture essence of this process.

Furthermore, it cannot account for the phenomenon referred to by Foucault as *interplay of power and pleasure*. Through confessional practices, power increased embracing the body; it came so close to the body that no autonomy, no sacred boundaries of intimacy could keep it away. Foucault concludes that this intense and overwhelming proximity, this bold intrusion of scientist (doctor, psychiatrist, educator) into patient's body effectuated an *interplay of power and pleasure*. Those in power begin to enjoy exercise of power, feeling pleasure in doing what they do, while the objects of their investigative gaze began to feel power through becoming the distinctive objects. As if their individuality and their identity suddenly got its own distinctive sexual character. They were animated, isolated, made unique – they received status *empowered* by becoming an object of power practices, a sort of foothold for power-practice itself. And what is more, each of these perverted *manifold sexualities established in turn its correlate procedure of power*[i]. This interplay reveals an inherent tendency of power to sustain itself, while empowering both sides of the binary pair. It reveals how the establishment of binary relations doctor/patient (nucleus of power in this case) led to the establishment of medical science as a new profound power. It also reveals dynamics of power explaining transformation within basic power-relation.

Classical conception of power (power situated on hierarchical top) could not account for this. It also failed to give an insight into the process whereby science and medicine by using sexuality as a medium initiated practices and concerns that go way beyond the public health. Eugenics and race hygiene are examples of this.

However, indicating the inadequacy of the repressive hypothesis in this way amounts to phrasing criticism in Foucault's terms. Nucleus of power, power-

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[i] *The History of Sexuality"* p. 47; Michel Foucault

relation, power-alliances, medium of formation of power-relations - all of these are part of the apparatus devised by Foucault in analysing the conception of power and its historical changes. Any defender of the repressive hypothesis may respond by saying that its alleged failure is due to its inability to fit different conceptual framework – the one embedding Foucault's conception of power. However, this is not the reason in itself to discard it straightaway. New conceptual framework needs to stand the test against the evidence in order to prove its validity as an interpretative tool. He may also say that the paradoxical result of the repressive policies is not a contradiction; hence, the hypothesis does not fail on logical grounds. Paradoxes can be true. This, however, is not a very convincing defence. It does not add to the quality of the hypothesis if it ends with as much exceptions to the rule as instances that confirm it. In any case, Foucault's criticism already suggests the solution – the reconceptualisation of power.

Power – traditional conception

From considerations above it follows that there is a point of contradiction between the repressive hypothesis and the development around the sexuality that has taken place since the end of 17th century. Saying that this was a side effect of the restrictive politics exercised from above is simply not well enough, if not straightforwardly wrong. The case is rather, says Foucault, that something is wrong with the conception of power. It is here that the source of contradiction is to be located.

To be able to see this one has to think of how power is commonly understood and try to uncover reasons for this. Power was usually understood in *juridico-discursive* terms. It is understood as a mechanism of repression, limitation and restrain. The power is understood in terms of law, with the emphasis on its prohibitive function. It is the law of the sovereign, which proscribes and directs actions of the subject. There is nothing positive in the exercise of power, but only negative in the sense of saying "no". This understanding, says Foucault, has its historical origin in the conception of power passed on to us from the Middle ages and times of monarchies. It is a monarchical conception and *despite the differences in epoch and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy[i]*. The reason for this, writes Foucault, is that success and effectiveness of power is proportional to its ability

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[i] *The History of Sexuality*" p. 88; Michel Foucault

to hide itself, and create illusion of the free space of action. This could be understood as saying that our readiness to recognise power and law as something meaningful is possible only if it entails freedom. It is a prerequisite for its acceptability.

Consider the abovementioned point regarding the truth of sex and practice of confession. Uncovering the truth trough the practice of confessing before the doctor (priest) was considered liberating. But, much of what has been confessed was against the law, since the law distinguishes between the licit and the illicit sexuality, forbidding the latter. Acknowledging the existence of illicit sexuality in one's mind through confession meant breaking the law. At the same time, it felt liberating. Hence, the truth revealed through the confession was linked to freedom, because the law was understood as suppressing sexual drives. Thus, the sense of liberation was possible only within the conceptual framework built around the prohibitive concept of power, which was but the power conceived in terms of the law of the sovereign who imposes prohibition on his subjects. Given this psychological reason why power was commonly understood in juridico-discursive terms it is no surprise that the liberation, whether in a political or psychological sense, meant breaking free from the inhibitions posed by the law.

Foucault challenges correctness of this conception and the correctness of the triad *sovereign-power-law*. The power of monarch is better understood as the ability to calculate, to balance, to make strategic withdrawals, to mask itself and create the space of free action in order to invade that space again. It is better understood if one, following Machiavelli, thinks of a successful sovereign as the one who knows how to navigate in an ever-changing field of power-relations. Foucault's suggestion is to do away with the Prince and give up the idea of a general matrix applicable to power-relations in terms of stability of centre-to-periphery relation. We should instead try to approach the issue of power in a manner that has been used in warfare.

Power reconceptualised

The solution for the contradiction lays in postulating a different notion of power. Juridico-monarchical conception of power might be to a considerable degree a correct depiction of power and many of its facets do remain, but, as Foucault claims, this has changed. The negative conception was transitory. For this reason, a new and more positive conception is needed in order to make it intelligible, and in order to

develop a coherent picture of its workings. The old picture is *utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalisation, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus*[i].

Foucault lays emphasis on the abovementioned point regarding warfare saying that the new conception of power and the relational character of power were already implicitly understood in warfare. It spread to politics without loosing its recognizable features – *relationality and dynamics*. This, to be sure, is neither purely theoretical preference nor speculative choice, but an empirical claim, which in addition motivated the reconceptualisation of power.

What then is power? Power is not something fixed, some stable property attached to someone. It is not unchanging and an exterior element in relation to its object. Power is a relation, or rather the dynamics of relations existing and operating on *micro-level*. The micro-level is the concrete case, an everyday situation. Power comes from bellow[ii]. It possesses a certain inner dynamic of constant dispersal, opposition, gathering and dispersal again. It is immanent to every relation - economy, politics, knowledge. Every relation is a relation of power being exerted, opposed, balanced, and made unequal again.

In this process, it is blind, in the sense that it is at the same time, as Foucault writes, *intentional* and *non-subjective*. Totality of the economy of clashing interests operating in disequilibrium of forces constitutes the conglomerate of single intentions, which, once they are put to work, become unintelligible for a single consciousness. This means that a certain constellation of forces obtained in a certain phase of the process of perpetual changes cannot be traced back to an individual consciousness and an individual intention.

At the extreme end, one could say that from the perspective of a single consciousness, the dynamism of power- relations (power itself) looks like a stampede. Once the process of power-operations it is triggered by a single intention (a power-strategy), the process soon gets the life of its own. It starts exploiting potential forces on its way. It gains momentum, with forces inside it pushing it in different directions and producing the result about which no one can say that it was intended.

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[i] *The History of Sexuality"* p. 89; Michel Foucault
[ii] *The History of Sexuality"* p. 94; Michel Foucault

Anyhow, the dynamic of power maps the trajectory of relational processes, where power traverses different points of opposition existing within society (families, institutions, different social, ethnic or religious groups), align them and create cleavages that run across the social body, establishing what on surface appears as a stable binary relation of the ruler and the ruled. In order to view transformational processes in this way one has to work out the analytic of power and understand the logic of power. These two define the mechanism of power, and more importantly its dynamics. The power-relation is neither sterile nor static. It is characterised by instability and it constantly produces new tensions. It is due to this inner tension that it tends constantly to annihilate power-relations on which it operates.

Consider the following. Deployment of sexuality, by investing power into the body in an attempt to produce healthier and more vitalised one, aimed at increasing the quality of the population. But, the sexuality had to accord with a certain conception of family and the role family played for the population. It had to be functional within the family-population context. Nevertheless, by investing so much into the body, sexuality could not be confined to the procreative function. Body began to resist this confinement, and the more it has been invested in, the stronger was its resistance. Sexual revolution of the 1960's threatened to completely do away with the family. The phenomena such as pornography, body-building, body art, eroticism and the commercial employment of these, all of it witnesses to the dynamics inherent in the mechanism of power. Foucault regarded all of it as different responses to the adversary within power-relation, as different expressions of resistance and different ways of creating new power-relations with new positions.

Furthermore, power-relations exist only between free agents capable of entering into relations. They exist through redirecting and transforming intentionalities.

Foucault stresses four points one should keep in mind when trying to localise basic power-relations, their interconnectedness and the way they form a whole range of discursive practices. These four are rules of *immanence* - there is no exteriority, power is not outside or above relation, power-relations have strictly relational character.

Continual variation - one cannot hope to find a single and ultimate locus of supreme power; dynamics of power constantly reshapes already encountered power-relations. There is no stability inherent in the power-relations.

Double conditioning - no power works in isolation, and when it works against the other in a binary relation, the other is not simply its outcome or object any more than it is its support. Power-relation is two-ways street and within it, each pole of the binary pair gains something – its positions is (re)defined. Likewise, when one speaks of macro as opposed to micro level of power operations, one often makes a distinction in terms of strength. But macro is not more powerful than micro. Macro and micro form a pair of interdependence. The macro exploits its micro. It gains momentum from it, while the micro can only work within the horizon of the macro. In the case of sexuality the family (micro) is in a relation with population and at the same time within population, while the strategic tactic of controlling population (macro) relies on family.

Tactical polyvalence of discourses - instability of power-relations. Double conditioning and continual variation, both apply to the discourse as well. There is neither accepted nor unaccepted discourse, no dominant one; least of all the one that exists in isolation without any support and opposition. Polyvalence is immanent in the discourse as well as in any other power relation; it is a variety of discursive elements each being utilised in the game of power and applicable to different strategies and different objectives. The knowledge produced in the discourse is linked with power – it is the result of different discursive practices, of contrary positions opposing each other while trying to make their claim to truth. The totality of this discursive universe is a power game, and the intelligibility of what is stated, argued and communicated becomes accessible only in the context of the discursive confrontation. Strategic moves are invested with meaning, that cannot be deciphered by reference to the rules of linguistic conduct and a meaning formation. It stretches beyond the linguistic convention. Nor is the meaning of power-act exhausted by the reference to the strategy of which it is a part, since it would presuppose that the power already operated on it from above and that it is contained in the intention. Its meaning is constituted by the effect it produces. It becomes intelligible in the virtue of its success in rearranging pre-existing power-relations, in what Foucault calls tactical productivity and strategic integration.

Epistemological reasons for the reconceptualisation of power

The conception of power suggested above explains the discursive practices concerning sexuality, their intensification, dispersal and variety – in short, it

offers more plausible history of sexuality. The new conception of power apprehends sexuality as the *medium* through which number of power-relations - man/woman, pupil/teacher, administration/population, child/ parent - has established both itself and its structure. Hence, the conception of power offered by Foucault serves as an interpretative tool. It makes the process of the transformation of sexuality visible and intelligible. This is an epistemological reason for the reconceptualisation of power.

It helps put historical phenomena in a right order, while avoiding contradictions that haunted the repressive hypothesis. Since, as claimed by Foucault, every relation is a power-relation, it seems that the field of application of this interpretative tool is quite extensive. It is applicable to all segments of social life where power is at work. Whether this counts as the quality or as the deficiency of the concept of power as the interpretative tool remains to be investigated.

Anyway, these epistemological implications can be assessed from the opposing perspective. One can question the explanatory quality of the classical concept of power. One may arguably fear the futility and circularity if one tries to explain everything in terms of sovereign power, regardless whether the sovereign is understood as ruling class, monarch or something else. Despite some truth in such approach (It is true that free sex was repressed and that the lunatics were confined because they represented an economically dysfunctional element), a simple schema of power being exercised from above would nevertheless mean oversimplification, overshadowing the dynamism of power-relations. It would reduce the complexity of interaction of different interests and the ways they come to the fore in the discourse.

More importantly, insisting on the classical conception, one misses the essential point regarding power. It is these mechanisms, techniques, methods and practices used in order to purse repressive politics that are essential. Instead of trying to explain things through abstractions, by referring to classes, bourgeois interest in general etc. one has to concentrate on the deployment of medical treatment of lunatic, procedure of surveillance of child's sexuality in schools and at home etc. One has to inspect things at the level of agents and their actions, since the bourgeoisie had a lot more interest in them. In order to understand the power of the bourgeoisie and the political transformation from monarchy to republicanism one has to move away from the centres towards the periphery, because it is from the periphery that the true power arises. As Foucault himself observes in the second lecture of *Society must be defended*,

expressions such as "bourgeoisie" and "interests of bourgeoisie" had no real content in an attempt to explain application of techniques of power. What was real were methods and procedures of surveillance, exclusion, apparatus of medicalisation etc., which at some point turned to prove their economic and political utility, and were for those very reasons institutionalised and adapted by the state apparatus[i]. The bourgeoisie had no interest in madman or child's sexuality as such, since it gave no profit. But once they realised the utility of the control mechanisms, they actively tried to exploit it.

For similar reasons one may distrust an explanation of political transformation in terms of ideology. It may be true that every political system is accompanied by an ideology, but it is not the ideology as such that can formulate all interests and execute policies for securing these interests. In an attempt to analyse a real existing political system and the mechanisms that sustain it, it is not enough to refer to an underlying ideology. Every political system with its sub-structures of power is dependant upon basic operations of accumulating knowledge and the methods of its selection and application. All of these basic operations form power-relations, which are the building blocks of any super-structural system of state power.

Thus, understanding history is like any other interpretative process. It needs a grid of inelentibility that makes different phenomena appear as a coherent whole. The goal is not to reduce the abstract to the concrete, but to understand how the abstraction works in a concrete case and how the abstract utilises the existent. One is thus not invited to think of ideology as the system of ideas converging at the point of political action. One is invited to think of the ideology as a kind of meta-instrument, which combines other, more concrete instruments applied in everyday situation.

Instrumental reasons for rethinking power

Apart from the epistemological reasons, there are instrumental reasons for rethinking power. Thinking of power in positive terms is, according to Foucault, to get hold of more "true" or more "powerful" power. The power consisting in brute force tends to be a short-lived phenomenon. Exercising power in a negative way demands enormous amount of energy, because every attempt to impose a single intention (the intention of the sovereign), and transform it forcibly into collective intention, is being

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[i] *"Society Must be Defended"* p. 32; Michel Foucault

constantly resisted. Understanding power in terms of creativity is an incitement to supplement the temporal directedness (present-to-past) embedded in the interpretative function with the present-to-future directedness embedded in the concept's instrumentality. In other words, power is creative only to the extent it is used creatively. And in order to do this one has to have adequate understanding of power, which gives the opportunity to devise effective strategies for increasing and solidifying power.

Implications of the new concept of power – Knowledge, Truth, Intentionality

Both epistemological and instrumental reasons are premised on the same conception of power. In order to increase power and avoid perpetual resistance one has to develop strategies for creating harmony between single and collective intentions. As Foucault writes, true force does not operate against desire as Superego, but works on the desire. It creates desire, which in turn can create and sustain collective intentionality. It also creates knowledge, thereby imprinting into people's consciousness the responsibility for sustaining the accepted and already existing mechanism of power.

Knowledge is by definition general. If the belief is true and well-justified, then people are often compelled by the force of the argument to accept it. Once it is accepted, it becomes everyone's concern and everyone's responsibility. Often everyone has an interest in sustaining it, which is expressed through a common action guided by the collective intentionality. Thus, only by being able to gather and mobilise widest spectrum of interests through imbuing single individuals with common knowledge and desire to act in a certain way, does the power produces its most penetrating effect. Intentionality is thus crucial for understanding power-techniques and power-strategies. It is particularly important for understanding the *positive* aspect of power.

These two points - power as relation between free agents and convergence of single intentionalities to collective intentionality – lead the micro-level as the space of power operations. It is here that the creative aspect of power is most clearly visible. It is also here that the individualising aspect of power is most effective. Common knowledge produced through discourse establishes the link between the discourse and the individual, creating thereby the strongholds in every single power-relation. Thereby the effect of truth as individualising power becomes visible.

Further, the discourse itself represents the *regime of truth*, which contains implicitly and explicitly accepted criteria for the production of truth. These criteria are generally accepted and function as the criteria for which statements are allowed. In this way, the knowledge produced in the discourse makes truth act as power. Everything that has not been admitted by the discourse becomes powerless.

Of course, the regime of truth is not the limitation sat by the transcendent subject. It does not consist neither of the transcendental categories of the possibility of knowledge, nor the logical categories of what can be meaningfully stated. The regime of truth is about the limitations imposed by factors other than epistemological considerations. It functions as a filter, that prevents everything rendered dangerous, undesirable, amoral, politically destabilising, unpopular or simply irrelevant becoming the object of investigation. It defines the "investigative needs" and directs the investigations resulting in the modification of the object and in the change of the criteria of what can be reasonably stated about the object. In ethical or political terms, the regime of truth is what constantly poses a challenge to what may be called the intellectual integrity or academic conscience.

This is not to say that the distinction between truth and untruth, between science and ideology collapses. Epistemological categories and reflections on these categories do retain their validity. What is important here is to understand the effect of power contained in truth and discourse. It is important here to see how the production of truth in the discourse and the production and proliferation of knowledge through the discourse adds to the solidification of power in the context in which it is put to work.

This means that knowledge and truth carry some important epistemological implication for Foucault. He termed his method of accessing and assessing knowledge as archaeology of knowledge. One may wonder (as philosophers presumably do) why people understand things as they do, or one may simply wonder what makes certain knowledge acceptable, justified and commonly accepted as true. In other words, one may engage in epistemological reflections, and try to establish criteria for distinguishing knowledge from non-knowledge. This kind of reflection often tends to abstract from concrete discursive practices aiming at universally valid criteria applicable to knowledge in general.

However, Foucault's concern lies precisely with the real life situations, with exiting discourses. He is interested in what way different discourses influence each

other, what kind of interaction among discourses is not merely possible but actual. As he himself formulates, *the episteme is not sort of grand underlying theory, it is a space of dispersion, it is an open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationship[i]*.

Hence, instead on speculating over transcendental condition of knowledge and chasing a spooky transcendent subject, the focus is on the processes of how knowledge in one discourse is effectuated by another discourse. The discourse is like a monument, a historical event, and in order to learn something about it, it is necessary to understand how it was erected. One has to know which forces were in play, how the dynamism of their relations affected and modified the discourse. It is necessary to know which discourse became dominant, which one exerted the decisive influence and in general, how this discontinuity (change) in the development of a discourse took place.

This historical discursive interaction consists in the imposition of a new conceptual frame, which has the effect of altering the object of the discourse by assigning a different place to it within new conceptual framework. For instance, 18th and 19th century witnessed the transposition of political categories into the field of biology and medicine creating new types of objects of medicine and consequently a new type of knowledge. As a result, new types of claims were possible, and Foucault's interest lies in how formative rules of sentences in a single discourse were affected.

This epistemological implication is reflected in the instrumentality of the positive concept of power. The creativity of power is nothing else but the deployment of different strategies for creating collective intentionality through linking components *desire-knowledge-truth-discourse-individual-collective*. And this linkage is possible only through a certain medium. The medium used has to have the biggest scope possible, and political signification of sexuality lies in the fact that *sex is located at the point of intersection of the discipline of the body and the control of the population[ii]*.

Power, medium, conceptual shift and rule of norm

In *History of Sexuality* Foucault showed how power by affecting the medium creates new power alliances. He identified two strategies - the *deployment of alliances* and *deployment of sexuality*. Deployment of alliances refers to the family and

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[i] *"The Foucault Effect"* p. 55; G. Burchell and P. Miller
[ii] *"Power/Knowledge"* p. 125; Michel Foucault

kinship, which served as the basis for defining the transmission of possessions and the laws determining this transmission. It fixed the positions within monarchical society. Deployment of sexuality refers to the role of sexuality for the dissolution of the old power-alliances (families/ kinship) that were the pillars of the old monarchical society.

Sex was the basis for both the deployment of alliances and sexuality, though in a different manner. It gave rise to the deployment of alliances by creating them. But the role of sex limited to the creation and deployment of alliances lost its significance, when economic processes had no longer use for it and when it no longer was a reliable factor in calculating political power[i]. Since the family's capacity to sustain political power deteriorated, new power-strategies targeted family by reconceptualising it in terms of functionality - it targeted the conceptual relation of sexuality and family. Apart from being functional and procreative, sex was conceived as something sensual - an intensive type of bodily experience, quality of pleasure, psychological mechanism of social affirmation. Discursive practices, the truth of sex, the strategic unities mentioned above, all of this caused the rethinking of sexuality through uncovering secrets of sex. Conceptual shift consisted in freeing sexuality from the narrow scheme of marital order.

The new (understanding of) sexuality could no longer be associated with the traditional family. Classical family had a double relation to the law. It was both its "matter" (that which the law was about) and its warrant. On the other side, the law fixed the juridical status of the family – it was its juridical blueprint, the legal status of the concept of family. These two seem to create the pair of symbiotic interdependence. If the conception of family altered, it would leave the law determining its status empty and devoid of validity. In this way, the legal order resting on an empty law can be legitimately challenged. Any resistance to such challenging would count as an attempt to protect an empty shell, a senseless practice. Granting that the law reflects and affirms the pre-existing political and social order, it then follows that the legal illegitimacy of that order, together with the virtual non-existence of such an order, leads to the creation of a new order, which seeks its juridical affirmation through establishment of new laws.

Transcribed to "class terminology", it meant that aristocracy fixed the concept of sexuality to suit its political goals - inheritance of the privileges, wealth and social positions. Its concern for sexuality was motivated by fear of degenerscence, and

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[i] *"The History of Sexuality"* p. 106; Michel Foucault

sexuality was limited to the procreation of blood lines. The bourgeoisie too had interest in sexuality for the basically same reason - securing political position of those favoured by the system. As Foucault writes, the bourgeoisie converted blue blood into sound organism and healthy sexuality[i]. Recalling that the conceptual shifts are effectuated by interaction of discourses it warrants one to say that sexuality is not merely something naturally given, but is a social and historical *construct*.

There are important lessons to learn from this. The f*irst* one is that power needs *medium*, and that strategies of power consist in identifying the medium with the biggest scope. In the example above, it was sexuality. The medium of power is partly determined by the *intentum* - what intentionality is about in a given case. This means that the *intentum* understood as an end determines the way it is pursued (*intentio*), and both of these define the medium as the space of realising intentionality.

The second lesson is that at the bottom of these transformational processes often lies the *conceptual shift*. The conceptual shift is about affecting the medium. A medium is a concept, which when changed, provides a new perspective, new understanding and new knowledge. Conceptual shifts and social categories resulting from them entail a new order of things, a new societal order and a new value-system.

Third, operating through medium (concept, knowledge) the important aspect of power operation is revealed - the *norm*. Every time re-aligning of power-relations takes place through a medium, both the medium and these new power-alliances are conceptually changed. This often has the implication for the way they exert their power. Certain power-alliances occupy the firmest positions within society, without having their power exercised through legislative acts. They act as norms, providing normative reasons for determining collective intentionality[ii]. This is the most refined aspect of power and a very instructive point for deploying power-techniques. It reveals how in the society, with well-established ways of communication, the collective intentionality can be formed through reconstructing reality by reconstructing meaning. In this way people's consciousness and their self-understanding can be changed. This

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[i] "*The History of Sexuality*" p. 126; Michel Foucault

[ii] Normativity should not be taken in strictly ethical sense. Normative reasons can encompass pragmatic and practical reasons in instrumental sense, or mixture of all of them. Architecture of urban areas, for instance, often reflects aesthetic concerns, need for marking different social status (castles, government buildings e.g.), concern for public health (limit on the number of inhabitants and their physical proximity e.g.) and practical concern (regulated traffic, durability in harsh conditions, ability to withstand earthquakes or bombardment, easy access by the police force e.g.).

point was implicitly contained in the reflection on knowledge and its individualising role. Knowledge makes it possible to act on normative reasons. Because knowledge often defines and creates the desire, acting on norm provides additionally reasons for action. By acting as/through the norm, power increases in proportion to the increase in the commonality of shared views, customs, beliefs etc.

Well, saying that knowledge creates desire it is perhaps a too strong claim. However, it is fair to say that knowledge can profoundly affect a desire, so that in certain contexts one can speak of the creation of desire in the sense of utterly changing one's dispositions and inclinations. My desire to become vegetarian is produced by my knowledge that it will improve my health. Of course, I do not need the same kind of knowledge in order to desire health rather than sickness. Thus, one may object by saying that at bottom the desire requires no knowledge. Nonetheless, knowledge reflects back on the desire. To understand an action - ordering broccoli rather than a hamburger – requires understanding of how knowledge affected my desire to eat (desire) broccoli rather than the hamburger. Hence, knowledge both creates and determines the action.

Finally, power-strategies (power-techniques) consist precisely in using and manipulating a certain medium in order to produce new power-alliances. Often knowledge cannot be produced in a desired way, nor is it always feasible to invent point of view in order to convince the audience and create new power-alliances. Hence, power strategies are not always about producing knowledge, but about making an alternative interpretation more convincing. It is about utilising already existing knowledge and turning potentially damaging knowledge into advantage by means of manipulations, distortions, reticence, making things appear too complex and inaccessible or sometimes simply by out-shouting the opponent. This is a part of the discursive practices viewed as a real event, the regime of truth in its actuality.

Concept of power in its interpretative role

These four lessons represent the phenomenal description of power. Yet, they do not embody a theory of power nor provide an answer to the question what power is. In his first lecture from a series titled *Security, Territory, Population,* Foucault states that *his analysis simply involves investigating where and how, between whom, between what points, according to what processes and with what effects, power is*

applied, and it can only be understood as the beginning of the theory of power[i]. Can we be content with this?

The concept of power generates the perspective for viewing social processes and political events as being essentially the effects of power. This perspective implies that understanding history is about understanding the mechanism of power. Furthermore, a concept of power causes the discursive practices to appear more like an intellectual or ideological battleground. This has an important epistemological implication. I have already mentioned some of them - relation between different discourses, the way they affect the production of knowledge by "exporting" conceptual frameworks, etc. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate all of them. It is Foucault's concept of power in its interpretative role that is of interest here.

Expressed in Foucault's terminology, the concept of power can function as a grid of intelligibility. It can help order historical phenomena by uncovering an underlying process of formation of power-alliances. Since this process applies both to the realm of discourse and to the realm of material action reflecting their interdependence, it would be misleading to try to view them in isolation. Recalling the role of the norm for power it is clear also on Foucault's account that a concrete action becomes intelligible against the normative context, generated by the discourse. Hence, the concept of power in its interpretative function helps uncover the links not only from one discourse to another, but from a discourse to an action as well. That is, it provides us with a clue for understanding historical developments and changes by tracing the points of interference of discourses and identifying related extra-discursive factors.

In order to be able to do this satisfactorily, we need to have sufficiently developed concept of power in order to be able to demarcate a power-relation from a non-power relation. That is, we have to be able to tell what makes a relation into a power relation. Only then can we use it safely as an interpretative tool. This is not made easier by Foucault's claim that power is an intrinsic property of every relation.

Power and communication

There are various ways of approaching this problem. For instance, if power works through a medium and a medium is a concept, then it seems that the issue

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[i] *"Security, Territory, Population"* p.2; Michel Foucault

of power can be addressed in the similar way as the issues of communication. Likewise, if power is an intrinsic property of the relation and the relation itself always of a social character, then the power is communicable. Hence, its working depends on the manner in which it is communicated. This suggests that a power-act resembles a speech-act and that these indeed are often the same act.

However, trying to grasp a power-act as a speech act may solve only some of the problems. Unlike communication, power does exist outside the language, and hence, it does not really depend on communication. Or if one objects by saying that communication is not limited to language (Is it not impossible to communicate pleasure by making noises?) then we may say that (communication of)power extends the communicative praxis beyond the linguistic conventions and perhaps even beyond what Grice termed as a "non-natural meaning"[i]. Walls and fortresses communicate power by simply being there. Still, if one objects that it is people who by erecting walls communicate power, then one may instead think of a steep mountain slopes or canyons.

Furthermore, if power in its working escapes the intention, then it is hard to see how an act targeting power is to be understood. Is it an illocutionary or perlocutionary speech act? Is it enough to give orders or is it only if the orders are carried out that the power really obtains. One may settle for less and say that in order to communicate power one uses directives[ii] with the strong illocutionary force, since their illocutionary point is to get someone to do x. That means that power is communicable, since the intention is communicable.

However, this does not yet mean that power is real and consequently that the relation is a power-relation. It is only when an intention or a part of the intention is realised that the power-relation is established. But on Foucault's account it is not necessary that the intention is realised for the power to obtain. It is this elusive reality of power that exists outside the linguistic convention and outside the intention that is of interest for Foucault. This is perhaps due to our intuitive understanding that power is not only a social relation, but also brute force. This may answer the question of how a power-relation can be established (or affected) if the mediation is impossible due to the lack of a linguistic medium. Well, simply by punching, kicking, throwing stones etc. But, this is not what Foucault had in mind. Brute force is not "true power". The focus is

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[i] See *Meaning*; H.P. Grice 1957
[ii] See *Taxonomy of Illocutionary acts*; John Searle 1979

on the relational character of power – the power understood against the freedom. This brings us back to getting someone to do something. It is the collective action and the collective intentionality that are central to power in a social context.

However, one may object by saying that the exclusion of brute force from the account of power deprives us of the opportunity to deal with the most conspicuous historical event - the war. And this is even more dissatisfying when we recall that the subject under the investigation is nationalism understood as a power strategy. We know for the fact that nationalism in history has always been associated with the war, and thus with the brute force. Still, even here, we may draw the distinction between the brute force as such and the communication of the same. Think of the difference between the "Final Solution" and the Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombing. In the first case it was an act of brute force, which although intelligible against the backdrop of NS ideology, is still the case of brut force. Nazis did not try to get the Jews to do anything (except to die) whereas US' government used the A-bomb to get the Japanese to sign the capitulation. Hence, we my say that brute force is functional of power and a part of the power, if it is communicated and if it serves a certain goal, which lies outside the use of brute force.

If power is real and escapes the intention, then it places a power-act in the group of perlocutionary speech acts, which can be transcribed into statements whose truth is determined by an extra-linguistic fact. This is what Foucault said – the meaning of an act in the power game is determined by its success (see page 14). Hence, in addition to power-acts established by those speech-acts whose direction of fit is world to word, we need the opposite direction of fit – word to world. Only then we can say that power obtains and that the sentence asserting or indicating power is properly used.

Indeed, the correct use of directives depends on the prior conditions of the real power-relation. Strictly speaking, an inmate does not commit a linguistic fallacy when he gives the order to the prison guard. (He may ask for a glass of water, he may demand a glass of water, but even if he shouts "give me the glass of water" it is not a linguistic fallacy, because that is the way, he believes, of getting a glass of water). However, unless he is joking, he is misusing the language because he does not apprehend correctly the situation. This means that illocutionary acts do not establish a power relation. Should we believe Heidegger or Sartre, we can always disobey.

However, since the illocutionary acts do represent power-relations they can be indicators of power-relation, and as such can be valuable road-signs. They tell us

where to look if we want to make a historical search in terms of power. This is in accordance with Foucault's phenomenal description of power-relation. It is enough to take for granted that the power-relation between a doctor and a patient exists by analysing their communication. It is the doctor who advises and urges, and the patient is the one who obeys and asks for advice, as long as they meet as a doctor and a patient.

Still, the directives may be indicative of the real power-relations, but only so long we are confined to the classical concept of power. Thinking of power in positive terms and the manner it works through the norm, the way it builds itself, it is clear that relying solely on the directives is inadequate way of tracing power relations. Doctor's power over the patient does not have to be expressed or indicated through commands. His authority is established by the extra linguistic facts (the institution of medical care), and it is enough for a doctor to use assertives (make suggestions) in order to exercise his power. Thinking of the role of the norm for power it is also clear that the commissives are as revealing of power as the directives. Acts of committing oneself to the national cause or pleading for the solidarity to one's fellow citizen also have a role to play in the creation of power-relations, and are equally indicative of the power-relations. What about declarations? By declaring a membership to NATO a number of countries created a power-alliance (a fact) that did not exited prior to that formal act.

This then means that the same taxonomy of speech acts is applicable to power-relations in the sense of communicating power, and likewise the communicative practice is indicative of the reality of the extra linguistic power structures. However, we are not thereby equipped with the linguistic criteria for judging which power-relations are effectuated through the communicative practices. We are not in the position to say that someone established a power-relation by ordering to an agent A so and so. Think of the captured general who kept issuing orders to his captured soldiers – we may question the genuine authority of his commands, but then again, we may never know for sure the reality of his power.

Proper use of language depends on the adequate apprehension of the extra linguistic reality. The historical document (a text, a discourse) contains acts belonging to all categories, and provided the communication was successful, we may say that the text reveals the structure of power-relations. Thus, we may hope to reconstruct the extra linguistic reality by looking at the text, and then compare it with the text to see whether the use of language matches the social reality. That is, we try to match the meaning of

an utterance with the extra linguistic fact, hoping that once the match is correct, we may learn something about social reality. Still, even when we do grasp properly the extra linguistic facts (formally defined power-structures, institutions, conventions, beliefs, practices, informal trends etc.), it may not be enough to grasp the meaning of an speech act. It is hard too tease out the meaning of a speech act even in direct communication. The case is not made any easier by recalling the fact that the meaning and the force of a speech act do not always overlap. What we do mean is determined by the manner in which we use conventionally established formula. What we often need (to know the meaning) is precisely the knowledge of the circumstances in which an utterance is made. This is needed in order to know the real effect of an act. A text, due to its non-actuality (historicity) often cannot convey that real effect.

Strawson pointed to the limitations of the linguistic conventions for the generation and conveyance of meaning[i]. His analysis reveals also how the conveyance of non-natural meaning (the one supposed to have communicative similarities with the elusiveness of power) is dependant on a number of situational conditions - the overtness and the mutual recognition of the intention of the speaker. These exist only in a concrete communicational context. This means that whenever an interpreter tries to grasp the meaning of an utterance, some of the non-natural meaning is irrecoverably lost in the historical abyss created by the absence of these situational conditions. The point can be expressed by saying that the non-natural meaning is conveyable only in direct relation between speakers, which entails that the historical analysis is unable to locate those power relations accessible through grasping the non-natural meaning.

Furthermore, in each category of the speech-acts we may find some acts, which are performed without using illocutionary verb, leaving us without reliable indicator. In addition, the list of illocutionary acts is contingent upon the historical and social context. For instance, within the hierarchical societies of the Middle Ages some acts were performable in virtue of a strongly accentuated social position, even though there did not exist explicit convention involving the use of a illocutionary verb. Thus, there seems always to be an elusive aspect of the social-reality that the text does not reveal. We may be then forced to adopt the least instructive suggestion, the one offered by Wittgenstein, saying that the meaning is in the use. This sets the limits to the revelatory potential of the text in reciprocity to the dynamism of power-relations.

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[i] See "*Intention and Convention in Speech Acts*" P.F. Strawson 1964

What do we make of these reflections? Well, we may say that the intimacy of the communication and the power does obtain in the social context, and that by applying our understanding of speech acts we may get the fair picture of the existent power-relations. However, we must be cautious as regard the conclusion drawn. Power even more than the communication tends to operate across and outside the linguistic conventions, which implies two things. First, we cannot use the linguistic criteria to fix the power-aspect of the particular relation. That is to say, we cannot use the taxonomy of speech acts as the taxonomy of power relations. We can use linguistic criteria only partially to cover formally accepted or acknowledged power-relations, but not always the real power. Second, the dynamism of power relations and the creativity of power do not imply the impossibility of recognising power-relations. As long as we are dealing with the social context which is at the same time the space of communicative practices, the true power will always tend to be reflected and affirmed in that context. Otherwise, it becomes completely meaningless to exercise power. An act of random and total destruction does not exhibit the rationality attributed to power (the topic of the following section). Such an act looks more like natural disaster.

Power as explanatory principle and the rationality of power – the level of the analysis

This brings us to the issue of the level of analysis. Granting that by tracing the history of the modes of communications we can trace power-relations in their formal existence, we can hope to uncover also the real existence of power-relations by decoding the patterns that established the particular modes of communicative practice. For instance, we do not need to know whether USSR and USA actually nuked each other in order to understand the reality of the Cold War. Believing that they could and would use A-bomb constitutes the social fact; it constitutes the social reality.[i] It is this social reality of real and "believed to be" power-relations that is of interest. This social reality is pervaded with power, which works through agents but is not in the agent itself.

However, by saying that power works through agents, it seems that we assign a sort of metaphysical right to power. Power appears to be an independent and real entity that works on us by working through us. This is not what Foucault's

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[i] This point is convincingly argued by John R. Searle in *The Construction of Social Reality*, 1995

enterprise is about. He declined working out metaphysics of power. His phenomenal level of analysis suggests this rather strongly. But there is a problem here.

If the concept of power is to serve as a grid of intelligibility, as explanatory principle, then we may have to go beyond the phenomenal level – beyond the historical reality of illocutionary speech acts indicating power-relations. The phenomenal level of analysis amounts to writing the history of power, which may not be more than just another history, running in parallel with other histories. As such, it cannot serve as the explanatory principle. History cannot explain itself.

It is immanent in the idea of the principle that it goes beyond what shows on the surface, and that it stands and/or reflects a certain rationality, which phenomenally shows itself as regularity. Rationality denotes the procedures observed and the methods used in order to efficiently reach the desired goal. It also denotes an inherent tendency to be efficient, and the necessity to follow exactly those procedures that are rendered as effective means for the achievement of the goal. Thus, the rational action establishes a link between the intention and the result by reflecting instrumentality of means - instrumental rationality. This means that making one's action intelligible implies that they are rational. Even though rationality cannot prescribe which particular action is to be taken, it can prescribe the *form,* which the action must have in order to be rational - and that is exactly the relation of instrumentality of the means to the goal mediated through intention. There is no use saying that any action will do as long as it works. Buying a lottery ticket can make one rich, but given the odds it is hard to argue that it constitutes rational approach. This is, to be sure, the ideal situation and one can wonder how many actions are really intelligible in this way.

In any case, the rationality dictates the form, and we can perhaps say that the rationality is formal normativity. An explanatory principle must reflect this formal normtivity of an action when trying to make it intelligible. That is, the actions are explicable by being subsumed under this normative form. In other words, only by assigning "deeper" ontology to power can it serve as a (rational) principle of both history and as an explanatory principle. Saying that power follows its own rationality amounts precisely to postulating this "deeper" ontology of power.

When this, essentially instrumental, power-rationality generates the perspective for understanding history it means that the agents are credited with "power-rationality", and sometimes even when they did not have explicit understanding of

power. This implies that agents do have the intuitive understanding of power, and that they choose actions that can solidify their power-position. It means that power operated outside the intention. This is what makes power visible to the interpreter even if it is hidden from the agents engaged in a power game.

This resembles Nietzsche's position and his identification of the basic motivational principle as the instinctual will to power[i]. It also seems to force Foucault's concept of power to cross the metaphysical boundary, which Foucault himself refused to cross. But thinking back on his claim that power possesses inner dynamism and is beyond the reach of a single intention, it seems that he is compelled to accept that power is both elusive and rational in its working. This is not yet tantamount to holding metaphysical position, since we still lack an answer what the power is or what the substratum of power is. (Here, it is important to emphasise that I'm not in Nietzschean spirit accusing Foucault of secretly doing metaphysics.)

Thus if the power is to explain anything, it has to have more than a mere phenomenal regularity. But then the connection between the metaphysics of power and the essentially free agent through whom power works has to be established, and it seems that the best way to do that is to credit the agent with an intuitive understanding of power. This means that the instrumental reasons issuing from the rationality of power are simply presupposed in order to be able to deliver an explanation. All this may not sound alarming except for the fact that in Foucault's analysis we have to credit the agents (administrations) with more than intuitive understanding of power[ii]. It is stipulated that they have explicit conceptual and practical understanding of power in positive (non-prohibitive) terms, exhibited in their actions and strategies deployed. But one should beware of doing this if the historical evidence does not support it. One should beware forging evidence by imposing rigid conceptual schemes. This, however, is the question of method and the way it conceptualises the evidence.

Power and ethical norm

Further complication originates in connection to norm. If power is intrinsic property of every relation, how then should we understand that by keeping the

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[i] See "*Beyond Good and Evil*", Friedrich Nietzsche.
[ii] Criticism targeting Foucault's free use of historical evidences regarding concepts population and populousness will be briefly presented later.

promise - acting in accordance with the norm that forbids lying – the agent A establishes power-relation to the agent B? Is an ethical action exhausted by explaining it in terms of power? What appears fairly easy to understand in many everyday situations, appears in connection to norm to be counterintuitive. In order to try to tackle this issue of the relation of norm to power I'll take the liberty of writing the following fictional story of *Seven men' army*.

Imagine the case where society, which lived peacefully and in relative comfort suddenly is deprived of the basic mechanism designed to secure comfort and functioning, i.e. imagine politically deinstitutionalised society. There are neither police nor army. Streets are roamed with armed men. The rest of people do not really dare to go out. Two of these armed men set up a checkpoint, dividing the territory in two. (To make it easer, think that whatever happens on one side happen on other side too – the two sides are indeed like the mirror reflections of each other). A third man, who is instinctively afraid of these two armed men is watching them hesitantly from his window, trying to figure out what they are up to. The fourth man comes and tries to pass the checkpoint, but he is denied the passage. He might even have a discussion with the two armed men. However, the third man (peeping Tom on the window) cannot hear and consequently cannot exactly know what these three men on the checkpoint are talking about. He can only guess, and given his feeling of uneasiness with the unfamiliar situation, he is very likely to think a worst-case scenario – they threaten to shoot him if he tries to pass. However, several days pass and the fourth man keeps trying to pass the checkpoint, but is denied every time. What from the window may have looked as the quarrel the first time he tried to pass the checkpoint, may appear now as if he maybe has some business with those two armed men (that is why he keeps coming back). Then one day the fourth man realises that the only way to pass the check-point is if he bears the uniform and is armed. So he comes in the uniform (the same as the one that the two armed men wear) carrying a machinegun, and joins the two man on the checkpoint. He can now freely pass the checkpoint, and it turns out that he has something of interest on the other side - he can perhaps get stuff. The third man can only see that three armed men now guard the checkpoint, and he is by now probably convinced that there have been three armed men from the beginning.

The fifth man, who happened to know the fourth man, is told (the fourth man told him) that the best way to pass the checkpoint is to take on a uniform. He wants

to escape, but he does not think the best way to do it is to try to cross the checkpoint the first time he gets the chance. The two armed men, who set up the checkpoint, know the two armed men on the opposite side, and nobody can pass the checkpoint safely unless he is given a permit by both sides. In other words, they can arrange safe passage, because they have an exclusive right of communication with the opposing checkpoint guards. So, he decides to join the three armed men, keeping his motives for himself and pretending to be a soldier. However, the only thing that the third man on the window is sure of is that the two armed men became four armed men.

When the four armed med spotted a sixth and a seventh man (civilians, who were just minding their own business and did not even try to pass the check point) they ordered them to come to the check-point. Convinced by their number and by their weaponry, the sixth and the seventh men obeyed and join them. The man on the window saw a small army rising. He can also hear occasional arm-fire and bullets hitting the rim of his window. He hides behind the wall, and cannot see who is shooting. The men on the checkpoint know that he cannot see who is shooting, and if the shooting from the other side stops, they point their guns at his window and shoot a little bit. Terrified and starved, the man on the window decides to ask for help. He thinks it is rational to ask for protection form the only one who can provide it – the six men army on the check-point. He thinks it is best if they are great in number, and that they should stick together, in the case the other side attacks. For all this time, he has never seen the other side, the enemy's checkpoint. But, by now he believes that it exist, for what would otherwise all these armed men be doing on the checkpoint. So, convinced by the situations (the way he perceives it) and his normative reasons he goes down and volunteers in what becomes the seven men's army.

If these fictional characters are given a real historical identity, which I believe that many who experienced a civil war would nod affirmatively to, then we have the real historical situation where power worked through creating power-alliances from nucleuses following inner rationality. Thus, we have Foucault's type of analysis.

Who has the power in this story? Everybody and nobody really. Everyone in the virtue of the things he can do holds firmly a certain position. If one thinks that the first two men hold the key to the whole situation, then one ought to think twice. By the time the army is completed, the seventh men may in virtue of his generalised reasons (perhaps categorical rationality) be the key to the whole net of small enterprises and

different intentions taking place within the broader context of civil war. He is able to solidify power by generalising his normative reasons. Even if he argues in favour of his action on utilitarian grounds, there remains strong ethical flavour, exceeding pure instrumentality. Hence, this is how power works through the ethical norm. The rationality of power is embedded in actions of each of these seven men.

Thus, when we think of true power working through the norm, we may not think of ethical norm. But, when we do think of the ethical norm as functional of power, we should perhaps think of the *seventh man*. Seven men's army is more powerful than six men's army is, and by adding seventh man and his ethical reasons, power of the army has increased. His ethical reasons may "infect" others providing additional solidification of the army's power.

To be sure, the seventh man's relation to others is ethical (he keeps his promises, he shows solidarity, etc.), but this has the effect of power increase. The moral quality of his action can still be judged independently of the power-effect it produces. What he does is good. But this is only the ethical perspective. From the perspective of power, it is good only because it has the effect of increasing power. Hence, keeping a promise is power relation, and taken in this sense, the power *is* an intrinsic property inhabiting every relation. The ethical *is* power to the extent it can generate a power-functional action.

One may rightfully object that this is not the "real" evidence providing the support to the thesis of power. One may say that this is a rather contrived situation construed conveniently for the purpose of the thesis of power. Well, I agree. It is a fictional story, which ought not to be mistaken for the historical evidence. The purpose of the story is to illustrate the workings of power. It depicts what appears as a real situation in order to elucidate the role of the norm for power.

However, with a little ingenuity, one can see the instructive similarity with the most real events. Think of the "Mohammad crises". The cartoonist had the intention of making money and making people laugh. The *Jyllands Posten* intended the cartoons as a symbolic revolt-gesture affirming the freedom of the speech and the freedom of the press. The "treacherous" imams who felt offended by the cartoons wanted to make the case for the salience of their religious autonomy by pleading for help in Islamic countries. Arla had the intentions of maintaining the export and disallowing the decline in profit. Other public media had the perfect material for their audience. Once the

political parties entered the "cartoon game", the discussion assumed political dimension, and each party tried to utilise it for their own political ends. In the end, the conflict got international proportion, allowing foreign governments to add to the cartoon story further significance.

This real life event bears similarities with the fictional story of seven men's army. In both cases, we have the number of different intentions, which add to the reality of event, but the reality of the event escapes them all. It gets the life of its own. Some of the protagonist in this real life event intend the cartoon story in similar or identical way, some in completely opposite. In any case, their intentions intersect at the event referred to as The Cartoon crises. Thus, the cartoons serve as sort of checkpoint – everyone willingly or unwillingly has to be checked against it; everyone has to have a standpoint as regard the event. The cartoon crises became a monument, where all these different intentions are inscribed. Furthermore, it functions as the medium through which the alliances are made, strengthened or dissolved. It is the medium of power operations, and as long as it can be utilised in the game of power it will remain in force.

If someone tries to write the history of the cartoon crises thousand years from now, she may try to describe the background for the initial intentions saying that in our time people made living as cartoonist and as journalists. But no one would be content with this irrelevant historical truth. This is not the historical significance of the cartoon crises. The historical significance consists in the manner cartoon crises affected formation of power alliances. The true story of the cartoon crises would have to explain how its significance arose by being utilised in the game of power. Its true importance as a historical marking point lies in the fact that it served as the point of demarcation on the basis of normative reasons.

What is the significance of these reflections for the present purpose? Well, both the fictional story and the Cartoon story represent the environment of power operations and the manner in which the environment is moulded by power-operations. It reveals the strong existential dimension of this environment, which makes the power-relations dominant historical marker. In everyday life one does not have to know the entire history preceding the situation one faces. Lack of such knowledge does not take anything away from its pressing reality. One has to make a choice, and if the choice is based on normative reasons, then it tends to create a firm alliance. Thus, the power is intensified through the norm, because normative reasons provide the universality and

the commitment to the single choice making up the collective intentionality. Hence, both stories reflect the fact that true power arises when the norm is deployed.

Another thing illustrated by the fictional story (the real one too) is that the events marking significant alteration in power structures are historically significant events. In order to understand them and in order to supply an adequate historical analysis, it is necessary to understand how the alteration in power structures was produced, which medium power operated through and in what way the medium was power-functional. If one was to ask what the truth of this event is one would be indeed asking which view came to occupy the dominant position within the discourse on the cartoons. If one were to focus on the statements made in the discourse in order to provide adequate historical explanation one would at best grasp only half of the entity inquired about. If one were to ask what the truth regarding the freedom of speech or the religious autonomy was at the time the crisis occurred, one would miss to see the real power effect of the discourse. It is the point of intersection of epistemological and instrumental reasons that is of greatest interest in the historical analysis focusing on power. In the case of cartoons, it is important to focus on the pattern of the disturbance they caused, since it *is* the pattern of power operating through norm. Whatever becomes predominant standpoint after the discourse on cartoons, whatever becomes widely accepted belief regarding the cartoons, will bear the same pattern of power operations. Thus the fictional story suggests the way to approach the text in trying to understand it.

Still, with these reflections on power, we may not be much closer to determining what the power is. This at best defines power in a formal sense. It suggests possible paths of analysing power that may prove productive, and stresses the formal requirements that the concept of power as an interpretative tool should satisfy. Perhaps, the question about the essence of power is non-essential for the present purpose. Foucault was obviously not discouraged by the lack of a theory of power nor did it deter him from undertaking the analysis. We should perhaps be inspired by his optimism.

Conceptual shift, norm and the sociology of concepts

There is undoubtedly a theoretical side to the issue of conceptual shift and its significance for the workings of power. It is a common practice among philosophers to try to view things as parts of coherent totality. This applies to knowledge and

understanding. How people perceive and grasp certain thing can always be placed in the broader context of an overall system of ideas and representations. The system forms the hierarchy whose roots are general metaphysical presuppositions. Hence, in order to make it clear why we understand certain things in a certain way one must very often refer to the metaphysical platform upon which totality of our intellectual capacity rests. This is how the argument of one's claim is usually structured and it is also what the *sociology of concept* is about, according to Carl Schmitt.

Sociology of political concepts, if it is to be scientific, has to identify the parallel that runs through metaphysical, theological and political views of an epoch. Thus, what needs to be identified by linking metaphysics to political theory is *political metaphysic*. Only thus can true understanding of the concept of sovereignty be obtained.

In his *Political Theology,* Schmitt attempted to identify the connection between metaphysical presupposition and the political theory of the State. For him the metaphysical substrata was almost indivisible form Christian conception of the world, and he concluded that monarchy as a political form was based on secularised theological concepts – the principle of representation. This connection was evident in the kinship of the concept of sovereign power attributed to respectively king and God. It was likewise reflected in the functional similarity of the concepts of exception and miracle. Schmitt's worries lied elsewhere, and I do not intend to pursue his position at length. However, the point observed by Schmitt provides the support for the claim that conceptual shifts underlie creation of norms, which exert power by creating power-alliances on a more profound level than a law could do. Norms unite by providing meaningfulness to the existence of things, and not by merely inducing fears.

Rise of liberalism according to Schmitt, mirrored one such conceptual shift, which affected deeply anchored metaphysical preconceptions. The theological platform faded away, and the political form could no longer mirror non-existent reality. His investigation reveals how theological concepts, which worked in disguise exerting their influence on political thinking, gradually retreated and how the pair *monarchy*/*theism* was substituted for the *nature-economic la*ws/*liberal democracy* pair. He concludes with the statement of Donoso Cortes, that the royalism is dead after 1848.

The point to remember is that sociology of concepts when applied to political concepts provides understanding of political change. It explains also social change, at least to the extent to which the political and the social interact and cannot be

dissociated, except at the expanse of diminishing the understanding of both of them. However, the instructive point is that in tracing social and political changes, one does not have to go always so deep, since paradigmatic shifts like the one Schmitt observed do not happen all the time. In order to grasp smaller-scale changes in terms of creation of power-alliances it is enough to trace them back to the concepts they employ, by working out sociology of concepts. The mechanism of change is the same; a conceptual shift leads to the reconstruction of reality by reconstructing the way of accessing reality.

For this reason it is sometimes said that politics is about inventing names. The names in this expression are not simply names. It is that which contains political idea and which serves as means of mobilising forces. Names are devised to embrace seemingly opposing power-alliances thereby creating more powerful alliances.

Recall what has been said earlier about power strategies – they consisted in finding the medium with the biggest scope, through which aligning and re-aligning of forces within society can operate. The conceptual shifts, which consist in redefinition of basic notions deeply buried in our consciousness and our self-understanding is an essential part of the strategy for creating or exploiting already existing medium. What people identify themselves with depends on how they understand themselves. If the new "name", new political idea, can generate the ways of identification previously non-existent, then it counts to the evidence of its potential force.

Political history abounds with examples of applying power-strategies, which aimed at undermining pre-existing understanding and creating a new one. Carl Marx's invention of the term proletarian is one such example. In the context of his political theory and in the context of class struggle it managed to create the identification between the worker and the peasant, between different ethnic groups, different cultural and language communities. It managed to downplay significant oppositions already existing between these different groups – history of ethnic conflicts, role of the religion in everyday life, etc. Another such strategy is nationalism, which tend to create the means of identification across class and social division within society. This will be the theme of the rest of the study.

Part two

Nationalism and power

Notwithstanding theoretical difficulties mentioned above, I will in the following present how Foucault applied the concept of power in his interpretation of history. The focus will be on nationalism since it seems to comprise power in both its epistemological and instrumental function. The presentation will focus on nationalism as the historical process of aligning and re-aligning of forces (material action); nationalism as power-strategy intelligible against the backdrop of biopolitics (nationalism as norm); nationalism as an object of discourse subjected to alteration due to discursive interactions (discourse of nationalism embedding dynamism of power). I will also briefly present the concept of biopolitics, which is a direct consequence of the application of the positive understanding of power.

After this, I will present different views on nationalism and analyse their relation to Foucauldian terminology. By adopting the perspective given by Foucault's concept of power, I will try to define the position of nationalism within a broader ideological context. The task will be to try to show how Foucault's concept of power can mediate between opposing camps of analysts advocating ethnic and civic nationalism respectively. The issue of interest is the validity of upholding dichotomous demarcation between the civic and the ethnic nationalism.

Birth of nation through reworking the thesis of race war.

In the series of lectures, termed *Society Must be Defended* Foucault undertook a historical analysis which he believed revealed the deployment of the positive concept of power and evidentially affirmed the thesis that power works through conceptual shifts. The evidence consists in what can be termed "past histories", which refer to different grids of intelligibility and different explanatory principles applied in writing history in the past. One such example Foucault found in the writings of *Boulainvilliers*, who undertook an analysis of the rise of feudalism and transformations of political forces within medieval France by postulating strife as a permanent factor of

political transformations. *Boulainvilliers* established a regime of (historical) truth, transforming thereby history into an instrument of political struggle. It is beyond the ambition of this study to reproduce entire analysis, but some points of interests for the issue of nationalism deserve to be mentioned, since they illustrate the mergence of historical and political discourses in what he termed *historico-political* discourse.

Historico-political discourse emerged as a consequence of the nobiliary reaction to monarchical absolutism of late 15th and 16[th.] century. It marked the transition from what up to the end of 16th century was common theme of history tales - telling political history in terms of sovereignty. Roughly speaking, classical history consisted mainly in the *mythologisation* of the past, which had the function of justifying existing political form - monarchy. For this reason, Foucault termed *Boulainvilliers* historico-political discourse *counterhistory* (these two expressions will be used interchangeably). Political struggle at that moment had already begun to assume the form of polemical clashes, which resulted in one discourse being informed by another. Historico-political discourse represents in Foucault's opinion precisely an attempt to link political theory to history in such a way as to utilise history for political ends. It represents the realisation that *History is an operator of power, an intensifier of power*[i] .

Historico-political discourse states that the explanatory principle of history is not to be found in natural a necessity, rational unfolding of the spirit or anything that hovers high above the ground. It is to be sought in the three basic categories containing brute facts (physical strength, proliferation of one race, energy), moral and psychological elements (hatred, passions, fears, devotions etc) and contingencies (success of rebellions, victories, defeats, failure of revolutions etc.)[ii]. Any attempt at establishing continuity was viewed by the counterhistory as an attempt to grant the absolute right to the crown by postulating the principle of representation – the crown represents in the political realm the higher order of the theologico-metaphysical realm. The counterhistory has the task of unmasking the seeming continuity of history.

The political implication of this historical principle was the denial of natural right of sovereign and consequently of the classical concept of sovereignty. The natural right has been denied to sovereign because he no longer represented the unity of those he ruled over and because seeming continuity of rule is actually saturated with a

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[i] "*Society Must be Defended*" p. 66; Michel Foucault
[ii] "*Society Must be Defended*" p. 54; Michel Foucault

constant struggle and antagonism. The emphasis is laid on the distinction between those who are defeated and the enslaved by the victorious power, and those who retain their privileged position. Consequently, the possibility of identification of the subject with sovereign is denied too. In connection to this, the counterhistory had a self-proclaimed goal of establishing sort of historical justice. The historical justice functions as a legitimising stance for political struggle; the truth, which makes one's actions appear just. If the goal of the classical, Roman type, history was the reconciliation of the defeated and the victorious, then the goal of the counterhistory was to undo this reconciliation in the name of justice and truth.

Furthermore, contrary to the classical, juridico-discursive view of history, the counterhistory implied that there was not natural right to freedom, nor could the freedom be gained by reference to any such right. According to the counterhistory, freedom consisted in the capacity to deny freedom to the adversary. It consisted in an ability to dominate, and all striving for freedom was striving for domination and *vice versa*. The historico-political discourse postulates that all conflicts have this binary structure. Peasants forced to pay taxes, go to war etc., all this meant the splitting of the social body into two races (whether social or ethnic, or political), whose relationship is that of domination and opposition. Hence, the history has to be told in terms of the *race war* that permeates society and politics.

The term race initially did not have clear biological connotations. It refers to two groups, which may differ in more than one respect - ethnicity, language, religion, or combination of these. However, two opposing groups form a relational unity. It is the political unity resulting from pervious wars, a unity in virtue of violence. Two races coexist without being mixed and completely intertwined. In praxis, the race was defined as the association of individuals who share a common law, customs, status and who form the distinctive group also in virtue of occupying one pole of the binary pair of power-relation. This is a rather flexible definition, transcribable in different ways.

What nobiliary reaction to absolutism (expressed in the counterhistory) defined through deployment of the term race war was the notion of nation in a very broad sense. Since it was a reaction of nobles, they naturally identified themselves as a nation. There existed also a monarchical definition of nation, which denied the existence of nations independently of the King's existence. It claimed that the national unity of the group obtained and could only obtain in virtue of the king. This was a juridical

conception, which accorded with the conception of sovereign power and sovereign right. However, the story does not end here.

Towards the end of 18th century there emerged another definition of nation. It was given by Sieyés and had two aspects. One was *juridico-formal* and the other was *historical*. Juridico-formal aspect defined formal criteria for the nation – a common law and legislature. Historical aspect laid emphasis on the historical possibility of existence by focusing on of *works* and *functions* of nation. *Works* included agriculture, handicrafts and industry, trade, and liberal arts - everything that makes living possible. *Functions* included institutions that ensure proper workings of the nations – the army, justice system, the administration and the church. Works and functions made nation a real historical entity.

The importance of this definition lays in the fact that the juridico-formal part of the definition is indissociable from the historical preconditions of nation, which is considered decisive. A purely formal definition even if satisfied would not create the nation. Without a capacity for commerce, agriculture, without instruments that ensure its functioning and security against outside threats it would be an empty nation. The juridical or monarchical definition, so long it prevailed, downplayed the significance of the historical preconditions for the existence of nation. It merely reduced them to the effects of the pre-existing order founded in the last instance in the crown.

Now, once works and functions were understood as precondition for the real existence of nations, the political significance of those who were the bearers of the historical preconditions changed for the better. The bearer was the Third Estate. It is in virtue of their contribution that the nation existed as a nation. The juridico-formal frame cannot be applied to non-existent entities, but only to the group of individuals who enter into relations of production and exchange with each other. Laws serve the regulative functions for works and functions that already exist.

It seems then that everyone had his own definition of nation designed to suit his own political end. Monarchical jurists denied any political right to nations not granted to it by the King. Aristocracy defied this conception and the principled unity through the crown, conceiving of themselves as the nation. The bourgeoisie also had their definition, according to which all political and historical significance had to be ascribed to them, since they are what makes a nation and nationhood possible.

Furthermore, there is a significant difference between the "scope" of demands contained in the definitions of nation advanced by Third Estate and aristocracy respectively. Foucault's summary of the argument reveals that *aristocracy tried to extract from the monarchic unity a certain singular right that was sealed in blood and asserted by victory: right of the nobles. And it claimed....to reserve the absolute and singular privilege of that right for nobility*. Third Estate claimed on the contrary, that it does not constitute a single nation within a social body, but that it is *the* totality of the nation. "*All that is national is ours and all that is ours is nation*"[i].

What changes here, is that the movement from universality towards singularity made by nobiliary political demands is reversed. The direct consequence of this reversal is that the State becomes a totalising and universalising entity. Nation and state converge into nation-state. What constitutes the nation is the capacity of the body of individuals to constitute the State - to establish common laws, instruments of legislations, to sustain works and functions etc. Consequently, nation's strength consists in the ability of the State to govern, administer, secure the constitution and to control.

This convergence effectuated a temporal inversion, observes Foucault. Third Estate denied that the history (tradition) should be decisive for the acquisition of political right. It is the future of the nation that is at stake, and the future becomes thereby a decisive moment in determining political right. It is the immediate future already contained in the present. Past victories do not justify the right of recognition, nor does the glorified antiquity of monarchy. The present is true, and the affirmation of its truth lays in the future.

This temporal reversal affected historical analysis. Since the present is the truth, history became a sort of projection of this truth onto the past. The present is truth in the sense that it fulfils the historical process by which the State (national state) is born. State, so to speak, rounds up this process into meaningful whole. Equally, the past reveals no more truth than the present, nor can it acquire more right than the present. Hence, the binary structure of struggle of the counterhistory was substituted for inner coherence. This marked the return to the juridico-discursive conception of sovereignty, but not in the sense of establishing historical self-affirmation.

The history of the state is the history that uncovers relations between nation and state. It uncovers the density of the interconnectedness of what transforms a

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[i] "*Society Must be Defended*" p. 222; Michel Foucault

virtual nation into a real nation – the State. History abandons the warfare as the paradigm of historical change. Struggle does remain, but is confined to a constitutional frame. It is a civil struggle in the sphere of economy, administration and production. It takes place within the State, not between them. Military struggle is the last resort and civil wars are viewed as the breaks in the continuity of peace – exceptional episodes.

Two things are important here. One is that the polemic revolving around the notion of nation mirrors political struggle. It reveals how different power-strategies were employed in the struggle. Likewise, the struggle itself, just like the concept of nationhood, should be understood in terms of power operating through a medium by modifying it according to political ends. Another thing is that in order to understand nationalism it requires working out the genealogy of the concept nation, which presents the nation as the result of the political struggle between crown, nobility and Third Estate. And it is also important to keep in mind that this struggle took place in form of a discursive polemic, reaffirming Foucault's claim that the power works by conceptually changing a medium. This second point is exemplified in the way that the bourgeoisie re-worked the nobiliary definition of nation based on the initial term of race.

Biopolitics and the politics of biopower

Birth of biopolitics is perhaps the most significant consequence of the rise of national universality. Historical discourse advanced by the bourgeoisie rejected dualism of races and binary structure of conflict. This was done because the historico-political discourse, by adopting the strife as a principle, legitimised conflict inciting thereby to struggle. It contained an inherently destructive tendency, which the established political supremacy of Third Estate no longer needed. They constituted a virtual totality of the nation and its political theory was premised on monism – a nation had to be defined in terms of monolithic unity. The struggle that was going on within society was allocated to the sphere of institutions, administration and economy.

In order to execute this totalising political programme various biological theories about species, all of which can be termed evolutionism, offered themselves as handy instruments and illuminative analogies. When a group of individuals tied through works and functions is viewed in its totality, it exhibits features of an organic whole. It resembled an organism or species. This called for the reinterpretation of the notion of

race in terms of biological unity, which is limited to a certain territory and to State. This change in the perspective furnished new understanding of society. Society was no longer simply a number of individuals, but a population with its own distinctive character that could be observed, monitored, acted upon and controlled in the basically same way as a biological organism or species. Population conceived as a healthy organism represented political goal of national universalisation and homogenisation.

Population is a biologico-social category applied to nation as a political unity. It abstracts from individual bodies. That is, when nation in its totality is viewed as an organism, the population is its referent. It comprises all relations (social, political, economic, communicative) that exist among individual constituents. Constituents can exist on different levels depending on the type and the extension of the relation – they can be institutions, organisations, cultural movements, families, individuals etc. With the emergence of population, disciplinary techniques employed earlier (training and education of bodies for the purpose of increase in productivity) were considered insufficient and inadequate because they dealt with individual bodies.

When the nation (society) was viewed as a population it became the referent of the new type of politics, which Foucault termed biopolitics. Thus, biopolitics is politics whose object of decisions and calculations is the population understood in analogy with a biologically complex organism. The extension of the term biopolitics is thus all those political decisions and calculations that are informed by conceiving of their object in biological terms. This represents a new type of political decision. It abandons the classical idea of an authoritative decision in terms of command and obedience. It deployed positive concept of power, and transposed it to biology, devising the idea of biopower. As Foucault says biopower *designate what brought the life and its mechanism into the realm of explicit calculations and made the knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life*[i].

Somewhat paradoxically, although a population abstracts from the individual, biopolitical decision does target an infinitesimal level and builds its power from the bottom. To be sure, a type of political decision issuing from biopolitic is not altogether devoid of an authoritative dimension. In a biopolitical discursive context, command still means command. However, the change occurs in that the virtual power of the (bio)political decision derives from norm. Biopolitical authority commands

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[i] *"The History of Sexuality"* p. 143; Michel Foucault

through a kind of popular obedience. It pleads for the creation of collective political consciousness that sustains the ideal of societal harmony. This ideal (norm) penetrates society and empowers the political decision by individualising it. It is everyone's decision, since everyone (in the ideal case) in her judgment assumes a universalistic perspective on social and political issues. It is here that the norm exhibits its best quality as the medium of power. It is also here that the political conformism has it source. Hence, at the heart of biopolitics lies the reconceptualisation of the object of political concern, whereby biopolitics creates a discursive context, within which norms, the truth and the criteria of justifiability of political decision are defined. It represented a conceptual marriage between politics and biology.

Biopolitics can thus be regarded as a natural extension of the positive conception of power applied to nation. It is about power producing itself through a controlled production and insertion of life. The primary goal was health and prosperity of the population, since in political terms that meant nation's strength. The strength of nation was its biopower. Consequently, the kind of threat population faces is the one it faces as species. Since the strife was no longer the principle of the social relation and since homogeneity meant health, biopolitics focused on weeding out inner threats.

In praxis, biopolitics consisted in the application of number of methods for understanding the mechanism of population and in using them in order to affect the population. The methods used were statistical monitoring of the birth-rate, mortality, longevity, types of illness often encountered and the risks connected to it, as well as the costs and effectiveness of the treatment. In connection to this, the concerns for health of population were linked with the type of housing, life conditions and public hygiene. It also included dealing with the inevitable elements that may have a long-term negative impact like the average age, and the aging rate of the population. The instrument designed to deal with this type of concern led to the public and individual savings, pensions etc. One aspect of this concern was raising importance of environmentalism. Initially it consisted in strategies for developing urban areas that could facilitate an effective control of public hygiene, decease spread and criminality. Today it includes more general aspects such as pollution and preservation of rain forests. Insurance companies appear also on the list of biopolitical techniques designed to deal with the accidental threats ranging from traffic accidents to natural disaster.

Perhaps the crucial conceptual change that marked the rise of biopolitics concerned the concept of sovereignty. By reworking the historico-political discourse, Third Estate rejected the nobiliary notion of nation and revived the concept of sovereignty in political theory. However, there is a difference between the classical concept of sovereignty and the one advanced by the liberal thinkers. Sovereignty in the classical sense consisted in the sovereign's right over death and life. The king had the right to demand the life of his subjects, and he likewise had the right to their death. In practice, this right was exercised precisely when a life was taken. Despite the apparent asymmetry in executing this right it could be expressed as, "Take life and let live".

With the emergence of the State as a unifying juridico-political frame, which thought of its substratum in biologico-functional terms (population), the sovereign power could no longer be defined as the right to take life. Its functioning was premised on the positive concept of power that creates itself from a nucleus. Hence, its main concern was well-being of the population, whose life, as well as the life of every individual, (understood as a functioning element), had to be produced, secured, increased and protected. This meant the reversal of the abovementioned principle of sovereignty into one which says "*Live and let die*".

The sovereignty in terms of King's domination over his subjects is substituted for State's control of the population. It was followed by the deployment of a new terminology that replaced the classical concept of enmity. The common denominator for many of biopolitical concerns was public safety. The term *enemy* was no longer reserved for the invader on the border, although the 19th and 20th century had witnessed a number of megalomaniac projects of space expansions. The enemy is the malfunctioning element that endangers the species, an element that had to be eradicated. Eugenics was at one point in history an extreme episode of this type of concern for safety. Concentration camp is another.

To be sure, the practice of eradicating dangerous elements (cleaning of the population) did not only include killing members of other race or other ethnic origin. It also included political purges. The sovereign power embedded in biopolitics and exercised through policies of normalising and optimising biopower consisted in the right to make life and let die. The latter applied to all malfunctioning elements. The goal was universalisation, normalisation and homogenisation of the population. Political and ideological elements that hampered this goal were treated as deceases. The rise of nation

and modern national state had its beginning in the rise of liberal democracy. However, the ideas of nationalism, the ideal of homogenous unity of population, lived on in other political forms. Fascism, National Socialism and Communism retained the modern idea of nation. What distinguishes these political forms is actually the intensity and seriousness with which they applied the idea of national state in practice. They are distinguished by what Foucault terms the state reason.

In lectures published under the title *Birth of biopolitics* Foucault defines state reason as the rationalisation of praxis, which is placed between the State in it existing form, and the State as desired. It is the art of *governmentality*. *To govern from the principle of state reason means to make the State strong and stable, to make it rich and resilient to anything that can destroy it*[i]. National Socialism represents the state reason based on sever and somewhat literal interpretation of the biological analogy of population. Mass killing of Jews and persecution of political enemies represent two aspects of the same struggle – struggle for the organic and political unity of the nation.

This implied that the classical concept of sovereignty was often deliberately rehabilitated. All modern nation states at some point opted for a mixture of the classical conception of sovereignty and the liberal one. *Let die* often changed to *take life*. This, as we will see, had the implication for understanding nationalism. The reason for this free exercise of sovereign right lies in the mechanism of power. The inherent tendency of power for self-intensification was not limited to ethical demand beyond the ability of ethical demand (the norm) to function as an intensifier of power.

In addition to the reformulation of sovereignty, the biological perspective deployed in biopolitics affected also the concept of nation. As already said, Third Estate considered the juridico-formal dimension of Statehood as a formal realisation of already existing reality of nation embodied in Third Estate. Through the establishment of universal laws and general juridico-administrative structure, the State functioned as unifying force, which realised the declared political goal of universalisation, totalisation and homogenisation. The result was conceptual wedlock of state and nation, where the nation was definable in terms of state – *works* and *functions* within universal juridico-formal structure. Biopolitics, by laying emphasis on the unity in organic terms, additionally bolstered this marriage, bringing the state and the nation into the intimate conceptual vicinity. It was a sort of symbiotic interdependence – no nation without

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[i] *"Radjanje Biopolitike"* p. 15; Michel Foucault (See also Birth of Biopolitics, chapter 1)

state, and no state without nation. Of course, the symmetry was not always present and the State regularly assumed the task of defining nation if it lacked a clear identity.

Nationalism, as we will see, refers to the political project of nation building, by supplying identity and additional cohesion to that already provided by juridico-formal dimension. Thus, one could perhaps say that with the adoption of biopolitical perspective, the political theory began to operate with the concept of *nation-state* in a similar way as modern physics operated with the concept of *space-time*.

As already said, biopolitics constitutes a broader conceptual frame, a grid of intelligibility for most political decisions. This inspired many to use it in the whole range of contemporary political issues. Due to the lack of space, I will for the time being briefly mention only the article written by Deborah E. Cowen, which treats the abolition of the conscription in USA in early 1970s[i]. The article comprises several aspects of recognisably Foucauldian interpretation and reflects how the modern concept of power and that of biopolitics generate new understanding. In the early seventies pressure has been exercised from left-wings civil movements and anti-war protestors on Nixon's administration. At the same time, the economic prospects of Vietnam War became worrying. President Nixon has been advised by the Gates Commission that the conscription should be terminated. Such a decision was undoubtedly very popular for purely ethical reasons. It accorded with the spirit of liberalism and the sense of freedom so profoundly anchored in American political consciousness. However, the truth is, claims Cowen, that the decisive arguments for the abolition were based on purely economic calculations. Milton Friedman, an economist and scholar, who was leading member of the Gates commission, argued that the price that the US government has to pay for every non-volunteer is not equal to the expenses of his logy, health-care, and loss of income expressed as a potential decrease in profit and consequently less taxes to collect. The real price, Milton argued, is the sum that the government would have to pay to an individual in order to make the military service lucrative for him. In the case of a football star, the amount would have to be sky-high. Convinced by this argument Nixon abolished 70-year old law.

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[i] Fighting for "Freedom": The End of Conscription in the United States and the Neoliberal Project of Citizenship (Citizenship Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 167–183, May 2006)

The following administrations had to devise different strategies for recruiting soldiers. These strategies were primarily based on economic terms. Serving the army became for many the way to come out of poverty. A military carrier meant an access to medical care, good salary, economic security after retirement, good prospect for the children etc. The result was the allocation of the capital in terms of welfare from middle-class white communities in rural areas, which was the traditional recruitment base for military personal. Army attracted many traditionally poor Americans resulting not only in demographic changes, but also in a profound alteration of social positions for blacks and Hispano-Americans. Education in military regime, imbuement of army codes, different upbringing of children born into soldier families, all of this played in for the creation of what some sociologists were tempted to call the rise of a new *warrior class*.

The analysis elucidates how the conceptual change affected the motivational basis for military service. The concept of soldier changed slightly. It would be wrong to say that the ideal did not incorporate the honour and patriotism. However, the virtue of professionalism and prospects of economic gain began to play a decisive role. The very same arguments used in favour for abolition were transposed into the concept of an army-man. The outcome caused a social reconfiguration resulting in the re-aligning of societal forces and a change in their power-positions – the outcome that was not contained in the initial intention to devise an effective strategy of recruitment.

The analysis reveals also one new element, which I haven't focused on so far, and to which Foucault dedicated a series of lectures termed *Birth of Biopolitics*. It is the increasing role of the economic calculation for political decision. This tendency is linked with rising influence of neo-liberal thinking in the second part of the 20th century. The method of analysis in terms of rational choices (Game theory) provided the matrix for understanding most aspects of social realty. This meant that the organic functioning of the population is transcribed into economy, where the ideal of free trade occupied a privileged position. Biopolitics thus underwent a neo-liberal turn, supplementing the organic unity understood in biological terms with the unity of the economically functioning social body. The significance of this turn for the concept of sovereignty lies in the process of decentralisation and emergence of the art of governmentality, which focuses on conduct of conduct. Another significance of this turn lies in the way immigrations policies were designed and in the way that the criteria of citizenship were

formulated. This in turn had the impact on understanding modern nationalism, which will be shown in the following.

Significance of the historico-political discourse for Foucault

Boulainvilliers' analysis was not entirely new. He generalised the model already used in economic calculations and applied it to history. *He made the State's management's principle of rationality function as principle for understanding history. It is the use of the State's model of managerial rationality as a grid for the speculative understanding of history that establishes the historico-political continuum. And that continuum makes it possible to use the same vocabulary and the same grid of intelligibility to speak of history and to analyse the management of State[i]*. Hence, *Boulainvilliers'* counterhistory is an example of the discursive interference.

The change of focus in analysis affected not only history, but also politics and juridical thinking, which resulted in the equation of the object of history and politics. Although the goals of historical analysis and political calculations do not coincide entirely, the very same object is featured in both. This was reflected in the way politics tried to utilise history by applying political categories to historical analysis and then reversing the picture in order to provide historical legitimacy for political action. This strategic move demanded that the one to whom history happened is the one who is justified in creating history by taking political action.

Historical work of *Boulainvilliers* is also important for Foucault because it recognised the relational character of power and the dynamism of power-relations. It was *Boulainvilliers* interest in why and how weak becomes strong and *vice versa* that urged Foucault to write that there is no history of people or kings, but continual changes of the poles of the binary structure.

Further importance of the hitorico-political discourse lies in the subject of this discourse. It is, as Foucault notes, the shift in the perspective from which things are judged. The political discourse experienced sort of a Socratic turn. The one who speaks is no longer universal "I" of the philosophical discourse, the one representing an idea. Now, the subject is the one who is one or the other side of the conflict she is engaged in. The consequence became that the understanding of power moved from general to the

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[i] *"Society Must be Defended"* p. 170-171; Michel Foucault

particular. There was no longer a neutral subject, dwelling safely outside or above a battlefield, which can from its distanced position judge things objectively. According to the historico-political discourse, such subject was a phantom. Hence, the discourse has moved to the nucleus of operators of domination, paving the way for an understanding of power at the micro level.

This marked the gradual change of what it meant to occupy objective perspective, and what it meant to have an objective point of view. All truth, at least in this discourse was the perspectival truth. This marked the rise of perspectivism, and the abandoning of the idea of "the view for nowhere". All claims of universal character regarding social reality were made from the position occupied by the one who was involved in that social realty.

Of course, this is not an original new insight, but the significance lies in the kind of the subject's involvement in the social reality. It is the existential claim reality makes upon him, and consequently the truth that the subject speaks has to accommodate the perspective of the one who is engaged in the struggle for survival. Accordingly, this subjective truth has to be deployable in this same conflict. This meant that the truth is not only subjective, but in order for something to be true, it has to prove its instrumental validity. In the history of philosophy Nietzsche was perhaps the most consequent thinker who pursued this view to the extreme.

However, in the context of the historico-political discourse the important thing to remember is the establishment of the connection between power and truth. To possess the truth is to be in a better position to argue, to make one's case, to affirm one's position within a relationship, and to make the relationship dissymmetrical in favour of one side. Possession of truth meant that one is controlling and managing the regime of truth. As Foucault writes it, *the truth is an additional force, and it can be deployed only on the basis of a relationship of force*[i]. In any case, the classical conception of universal truth accessible only from the peaceful disinterestedness was either abandoned, questioned or cynically ignored.

What Foucault seems to observe regarding the truth and perspectivism is the connection between the two developments that took place simultaneously, but which were often explained and argued for on independent grounds. One is the decline of objectivism in philosophy and the other are politico-social changes of the late 18th and

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[i] *"Society Must be Defended"* p. 53; Michel Foucault

19th century. The question is whether these two developments can be rightfully dissociated from one another, and whether the validity of the arguments, which treat them independently of each other, can be assessed independently. Assuming that it can would amount to assuming that philosophical reflections, epistemology and metaphysics had no bearing on political issue. That, however, would be to assume too much. These two developments go hand in hand, each exploiting and deriving their strength from the other. Recall Schmitt's *sociology of concepts* and how metaphysical platform was transcribed into political theory as the principle of representation (see 1.11, pages 35-36).

Philosophical position, which denied the possibility of timeless order of things and the possibility of accessing this order through a metaphysical reflection, suited very well the goal of challenging the pre-existing political and social establishment made first by aristocracy and later by the bourgeoisie. What these two political forces needed was the ideological fundament and although the counterhistory did not provide exactly that, it nevertheless undermined the ideological foundation of monarchy. Anyway, the ideological struggle was a part of the political struggle. Thinking back on the workings of power - medium, conceptual shift and norm - it is clear that this ideological battleground is of greatest interests for Foucault. It is here that the discursive interference exerts its influence affecting the knowledge by imposing and modifying perspectives, which in turn generate new power alliances. Whether the old or the new political order represents the truth is beyond the point, since the truth becomes an instrument, a weapon of war. A new political constellation imposes its own regime of truth, which functions affirmatively of the political position it came to occupy.

Of course, the adherence to a relativistic conception of reality lasts only as long as the struggle itself. Once the political supremacy is achieved, the new establishment seeks to objectify and universalise its ideological groundings. This reverse movement is necessitated by the demand to strengthen the cohesive forces and to intensify its power. We will later see how A. Marx's interpretation of civic nationalism affirms this claim.

Is this an argument put in favour of Foucault's conception of power? Has the positive concept of power been put to the test and done well? Well, it is clear that Foucault's historical analysis represents a sort of *metahistory*. He uses *Boulainvilliers* primarily as evidence in favour of his thesis, but it is clear that *Boulainvilliers'* work

contains many elements and claims that Foucault himself advanced. Although it is difficult for me to question historical accuracy of *Boulainvilliers* or Foucault, the question remains whether the metahistorical perspective is sound and is possible on Foucault's premises. If the subject, which speaks the truth, is confined to the binary pole of the power-relation, then metahistorical perspective is as much an illusion as the view form nowhere. Hence, the positive concept of power in its interpretative role may be just another instrument used in the power-game, and the interpretation it offers can always be identified with some political end or strategy.

The positive side of his analysis is the suggestion that in order to know an object one has to work out its genealogy. A single segment of reality does not work in isolation. It spills over into other segments, it inspires other forms of knowledge to emerge, other fields of investigation to serve as its support. The historico-political discourse denotes one such conceptual frame that affected other areas of human thought and gave rise to new movements in other fields of knowledge production. Often, it was reworking or recasting of fundamental ideas in new a vocabulary belonging to the different field of knowledge. The historico-political discourse was manly concerned with history, but it is argued, it created strong linkage with politics and jurisprudence.

The important implications lies in the fact that different philosophical positions can be viewed as transcriptions of the ideas or principles that originated elsewhere. Sometimes the discourse is formed by factors that lie outside its structure. Nietzsche claimed this by identifying the psychological factors of resentment (reducible to physiology and biology), which were interiorised and transposed into conceptual schemes that are later objectified and projected onto reality, while forgetting both their underlying (subconscious) structure and their subjective provenance. Foucault's interest, however, does not lie in identifying the underlying principle of the concept formation. Such an approach "smells" of metaphysics. It directs attention away from the discourses in their positive historicity over to the speculation regarding the continuous and unchanging entities. It is in the sphere of the social interaction through the discursive communicative practise that the epistemological implication lies, since epistemology and knowledge cannot rid themselves of the social aspect. Hence, the suggestion given in his historico-philosophical analysis is that the epistemological analysis is moved from the general over to the global history of ideas. The focus is not on the possibility of knowledge but on the historical conditions of its actuality. This

means that the historico-politcal discourse advanced by *Boulainvilliers* has a double function. It is both the power-strategy conscious of the true power in its creative capacity and it is also the principle of both history and knowledge formation. In both cases, it deployed the positive concept of power, which for Foucault meant that the history of political transformation becomes intelligible only if the perspective adopted contains precisely such concept of power.

However, one may object that historico-political discourse deployed the positive concept of power only to a limited extent. Its field of application was a narrow political sphere of the calculation of possible alliances. It did not have, at least initially, the full extension of producing alliances by crating homogeneous political and national entities. Instrumental reasons issuing from the positive concept of power were not present, and hence, the power was less penetrating in the beginning. One can perhaps say that the real effect of the counterhistory was only the removal of the monarchical spell from the concepts of sovereignty and power. The full transformation of power occurred with the rise of biopolitics and discovery of population. Hence, the interpretation premised on the positive concept of power reads more into the case than it really contains.

Foucault has been charged by Bruce Curtis with historical inaccuracy regarding the discovery of population[i]. The problem is reflected in the imprecise use of the term population, which seems to refer to two different conceptual realities - populousness and population. Populousness, which featured as early as the 16th century, referred to the entirety of subjects distributed over different social categories and classes. Population, as we saw, abstracted from the individual in terms of hierarchical social categories. Biopolitic emerged through the progressive replacement of populousness with population, which means that we are dealing with the continuous transformational process. Provided that concepts have history and provided that in order to understand them it is prerequisite to work out the genealogy of concepts (archaeology of knowledge), then it is hard to see how population was discovered, since the discovery means a breach in the historical continuity of the transformational process. Furthermore, there is the related problem of circularity in terms of what comes first and what caused what. Does the art of governance refer to the administration constructing the population

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[i] *Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The impossible discovery*; (Canadian Journal of Sociology, 2000)

or was it only after the population emerged that the administration recognised in it its true object and consequently developed its own art of governance?

Both charges rest partly on Foucault's free use of history in the way that he sometimes forced the evidence into the schematic explanatory model. The question is to what degree this criticism is misplaced. Foucault was aware that ruling elites already in the 16th century kept records and monitored the population, and hence the population was not entirely foreign to them. However, this early procedures of surveillance had limited a goal and were local. Later emerged more extensive projects, which Foucault termed anatomo-politics - it was about *disciplining the body, optimising its capabilities, extortion of its forces, parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls* [i].

The change occurred when this "second" pole of power transformation was replaced with the biopolitics of population, containing all those procedures already mentioned (see the section *Birth of Biopolitics*). It is there that the modern conception of power became the *right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life*[ii]. The consequence was that the population received a new meaning, at least in terms of political significance. This new political signification can thus legitimise the claim that the population was discovered with the rise of biopolitics. Whether this discovery meant a break in the continuity depends on the meaning of the process.

Foucault's wrote fours histories[iii], each of them depicting the transition from the populosunss to the population at different locations and different times. The question is rather whether the break in continuity contradicts the genealogical analysis. I do no think that it does. A transformational process is full of breaks and changes, which mark different phases in the process. Genealogy (archaeology of knowledge) is precisely charged with the task of identifying those discontinuities and the significance of breaks and intrusions for the way the process unfolds. Discovery of population was not Archimedean "eureka!" type of discovery, which instantly changes the discourse by imposing a new scientific paradigm. This is rather a slower process containing many separate but not completely isolated processes, where each learns from the other, and by implementing new concepts and new perspectives gradually transforms its practices. Whether the science of sexuality began to use the concept population at the same

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[i] *"The History of Sexuality"* p. 139; Michel Foucault
[ii] *"The History of Sexuality"* p. 136; Michel Foucault
[iii] *The History of Sexuality,* see *Discipline and Punish, Birth of Clinic, and Madness and Civilisation.*

moment as the economic theory or medicine is not decisive. The decisive point is that discourses covering different fields influenced each other, and in order to trace this influence in both its historical positivity and structural regularity demands that the positive concept of power is devised. It is the proliferation of the positive concept of power that caused the conceptual change from populace to population.

This is what the history of sexuality revealed. The power-techniques employed since the end of the 17th century – the deployment of sexuality – led to the focusing on the body as the bearer of life and as the bearer of the population (body as a biopower). Thus, the history of sexuality served as the historical evidence, from which the positive concept of power was extracted. Consequently, the history of sexuality is understandable only from the perspective, which adopts the same concept of power.

This means that the interpretative potency of the positive concept of power is determined by the extent to which power has been used creatively. Biopolitics and its procedures of interventions and regulatory controls constitute the sphere where actions are caused by and understood in terms of the positive concept of power.

The case of nationalism from the perspective of the positive concept of power

Foucault's reading of *Boulainvilliers'* historical analysis suggests that the creation of nations in the new, unitary sense, was preceded by the conceptualisation of nation. Nonetheless, it is the fact, according to historians, that the conceptualisation of nation was acknowledging and recognising certain political reality, namely that that the power of the Third Estate grew so big as to disallow the political force to be directed against it by imposing the outdated conceptual frames. Basic notions, including the one of nation, had to be re-interpreted as to reflect the shift of power that had already occurred. For this reason it may not seem obvious that the conceptualisation of nation preceded the nation itself. Nation in a unitary sense already existed. There existed a relatively homogenous social group outnumbering other groups. Aware of its matured political strength it simply defined the notion of nation from its own perspective.

However, claiming that the conceptualisation was prior to the creation of nation, is to recognise the fact that although the group which used itself as the paradigm of nation did exist, it is first by defining itself as a nation and working out the concepts of nation and population that it finally emerged with its distinctive national character. If

we grant that this conceptualisation of nation may be called the ideology of nationalism, then it supports Hobbsbawm's thesis that nationalism created nations[i]. This would also explain the fact that nationalism, as it is known today, did not limit itself to civic form grounded in the political ideology of liberalism. It assumed also an ethnic form. However, ethnicity of existing political units was far less homogenous at the time. Ethnic identity was so loose and local that it is questionable whether it could really function as a unifying force. A nation had to create its national identity based on shared ethnicity, shared values, vernacular, common history etc. It was an essential part of a much broader project of homogenisation of the population pursuing the goal of strength and prosperity. Creation and cultivation of national identity will become a normative imperative imposed on the members of nation.

With Foucault's theoretical apparatus in place – power, dynamism, norms, medium, power-relation – I will in the rest of the study try to analyse nationalism by juxtaposing different views on the issue of ethnic vs. civic nationalism. One last remark may prove helpful. Even though the positive concept of power provides the perspective, it is not always that an understanding of power in positive terms is a historical fact. However, due to the lack of adequate names (and in order to avoid outright linguistic inventions) I'm forced to refer both to the classical and the positive concept of power by the same term – power – which may cause a confusion.

Nationalism - ethnic or civic?

Whether the form of nationalism is to be rendered ethnic or civic depends on the features pertaining to its essence – features of *exclusiveness* or *inclusiveness*. Ethnic nationalism is characterised by exclusiveness, while civic nationalism is essentially inclusive. Exclusiveness means that the basic binding principle of nation is defined rigidly and typically on the basis of ethnic criteria. Ethnicity is conceived as a pure biologico-political category linked to territory. Some would perhaps say that it is defined on the basis of kinship or blood bonds. Anyway, defining nation in such a strict manner results in the exclusion from the membership of all those who do not satisfy these narrowly defined criteria. This exclusion often assumes a violent form, accompanied by inherent antagonism. Usually, the victims are excluded minorities

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[i] Nation and Nationalism; Eric J. Hobbsbawm, Cambridge University Press, 1990

inhabiting the territory claimed by the majority. But, perhaps even more often, the victims are all those who would disallow an intrusion of "ethnic otherness" into the specified space of their nationhood. In other words, stringent demarcation of "us" from "them" reflects inherent bellicosity of ethnic nationalism. For the reason of exclusiveness, the ethnic nationalism is incompatible with universal ideas of equality and freedom for all. Liberal ideas are usually given limited space within political boundaries defined on the principle of ethnic membership.

Opposed to this form is the civic nationalism. Its most recognisable trait is inclusiveness. The criteria of membership of "civic" nation rest on the political idea, or rather, on the commitment to the political idea of liberalism. Its inclusiveness is reflected in the fact that all liberally thinking individuals, respecting each other's rights, can attain full membership of the nation, since nation is the nation of freedom loving individuals regardless of their ethnic, linguistic or religious affiliation. This is somewhat simplified, perhaps a sort of an "animal farm" picture of civic nationalism, but the main point remains – ethnic, linguistic and religious criteria are irrelevant. In principle, the civic nationalism is ready to accommodate (include) the cultural diversity of populace, and for that reason is not prone to conflicts.

However, many theorists would disagree here. In so far the nationalism is linked to liberalism and democracy, the heterogeneity is a vice rather than a virtue. And it is so in principle. Democracy understood as an equal distribution of political power is self-destructive, if it is done in the space lacking political uniformity[i]. Furthermore, even though ethnic, religious or racial division does not serve as a basis for conflict, the civic nationalism is not altogether unfamiliar with conflicts. Ideology can be equally fertile soil for conflicts.

Anyway, one must be careful as what to make of this distinction. If the civic nationalism grew on liberal soil, then it seems inseparable from that soil. It seems to be a kind of political outgrowth of liberal thinking. However, if we regard the civic nationalism as essentially resting on political idea, whichever it may be, that is, if it is simply defined in opposition to the ethnic nationalism, then both Communism and NS can provide the ground for the inclusive type of nation. But, the historical evidences of Gulags and KZs reveal equally strict demarcation of those eligible of membership as in the case of the ethnic nationalism. Reservations do not make things much easier either.

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[i] See "*The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy"* by Carl Schmitt's

It seems then that one stands at the crossroads. Either liberalism lies at the core of the civic nationalism, or to the extent it is based on a political idea as such it can be as exclusory as its ethnic counterpart. This means that exclusory practices are compatible with universalistic ideas. This is perhaps what the paradox of tolerance consists in.

One way to solve the issue is to presuppose the criteria of "what comes first". This would simply mean to say that the civic nationalism originated through an intimate connection with liberal thinking, and any attempt to define a nation on some other idea may not necessarily produce the civic form. In this manner, the civic nationalism *is* an outgrowth of liberalism. But this may not work, at least not as elegantly as one may have hoped for. This would suggest that every political idea has its form of nationalism. However, it would then be difficult to say what nationalism is "in its self", which is unacceptable, because one could not say whether "liberal nationalism" and "communist nationalism" are nationalism at all.

If, on the other hand, one sticks to the criteria of exclusiveness and inclusiveness, then the advocate of civic nationalism faces the challenge of explaining away the historical fact of internal conflicts that took place during the formation of civic nations and after they were formed. This choice reminds of the one that biologists faced, when they had to decide whether a dolphin is a fish or a mammal. The solution for nationalism may not in the end posses desired unambiguousness like in the case of natural kinds, but the prospects for finding adequate criteria are not so murky after all.

However, if the civic nationalism is linked with liberal ideas, then it belongs to the modern era. But, then it also seems to be an invention, lacking an inherent necessity. This is what a primordialist denies. In his view, nationalism is an intrinsic feature of humanity and as such it is as old as culture. If it is equiprimordial with culture, then its genuine form is ethnic, and genuine nationalism can not be dissociated form culture. Hence, nationalism not only has its root in antiquity, but nationalism is inherently exclusive. Consequently, the civic nationalism in this view may not be nationalism at all. Here we can see how the debate ethnic vs. civic nationalism connects to the debate concerning the origin of nationalism.

To be sure, arguments used in one debate cannot solve the issue in the other. The evidence of exclusiveness seems to go both ways. Neither ethnic nor civic nationalism are unfamiliar with the use of force and with the politics of segregation. On the other side, the civic nationalism may not even be a historically primary form. It, as

Marx's argument suggests (see 2.11), superseded the religious exclusiveness, building on the results established by previous exclusory practices. Likewise, the paradox of civic nationalism and its alleged inclusiveness is perhaps falsely inferred from the insistence on the historical order of events. Or, there is not nor has it ever been purely inclusive nationalism. The idea as such may sound as a contradiction in terms. Nationalism is a limiting political category *per se* – it always leaves someone outside.

Anyhow, the solution to these and other related problems is perhaps found in adopting a new perspective for viewing nationalism. A new perspective may not solve all problems, but it may nonetheless dissolve some of the seemingly paradoxical situations. In order to see it more clearly I will in the following briefly outline three different views on nationalism, which fall in two general categories. I will start by presenting Ernest Gellner's and Benedict Anderson's view. Both of them operate tacitly with the dichotomous distinction between the civic and the ethnic nationalism, and belong to the modernist camp. After that, I will present Anthony Marx's view, which suggests an analysis of nationalism from the perspective of power. He believes that civic nationalism is nationalism in its consolidated form. His approach will hopefully make apparent the potency of Foucault's conception of power as an interpretative tool.

Gellner's view

In his book titled *Nationalism* Ernest Gellner produces a compact and pregnant summary of his earlier analysis of nationalism. He initially distinguishes between organisation and culture, and asserts that they are the basic constituents of social life. Together they make up totality of social life. From this then he proceeds with defining nationalism as *the political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is basic social bond*[i]. This is preliminary definition, which nevertheless captures the essence of the idea of nationalism and the corresponding idea of nation. Nationalism thus defined has a further implication regarding transference of political rights and duties. Only the members of the nation can enjoy them.

The second step in his argument is to assert that culture and organisation are universal and perennial, whereas nationalism and states are not. This is to say that as soon as a number of people form a social community, this community will necessarily

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[i] *"Nationalism"* p. 3 ; Ernest Gellner

possess certain culture and a form of organisation. On the other hand, culture and organisation may not necessarily entail nationalism, nor should the form of organisation be that of a nation-state. In other words, nationalism is not a cultural property of humans in the same way as culture in general is. It is not universal, and hence neither is it necessary, as a hard-core nationalist would suggest.

However, according to Gellner, nationalism is not entirely contingent in the sense of being an invention. His position is a middle-ground between these extreme views, and he defined the modality of nationalism as *necessary consequence or correlate of certain social conditions, and these do happen to be our conditions, and they are very widespread, deep and pervasive[i]*. He concludes that nationalism is necessary to some men, while it is not necessary or universal *per se*. He distinguishes between *nationalism-prone* and *nationalism-resistant* humanity. The task is then to pinpoint the differences that are relevant for the distinction. The differences will presumably be grounded in the cultural traits possessed by those communities, where nationalism and nation-state exist. With regard to the temporal locus of nationalism, Gellner holds *modernist* position, which sees nationalism as the phenomena belonging to the *modernity*. His claim rests on the established connection between the modes of production and the form of organisation.

His argument starts from the premise that an agricultural society is a Malthusian society, where the output in terms of the produce and distribution always has the sum of zero. This simply means that the labour and the natural resources determine the output in such a way that the redistribution due to increased populace or a bad harvest always implies that someone will end up empty handed. There is no technology or economic techniques that may produce the surplus. For this reason, he concludes, it is natural that an agrarian society is inherently hierarchical and non-egalitarian. The higher position within the hierarchy one occupies the safer he is from the impending threat of famine. Which position one occupies is a matter of strength, at least initially. Hence, the strength was a virtue, especially when embellished in poetic formulations. Honour is, according to Gellner, *touchy sensitivity about one's status, blended with the cult of aggressiveness and skill in coercion and intimidation[ii]*. Consequently, the agricultural society developed a system of values, where the honour

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[i] *"Nationalism"* p. 11 ; Ernest Gellner
[ii] *"Nationalism"* p. 18 ; Ernest Gellner

occupies the top. The system of values thus encoded in a society constitutes the core cultural element, and the main function of culture in an agrarian society is *to enforce, underwrite and render visible and authoritative the hierarchical status system of that social order* [i]. For this reason, the agrarian society is characterised by cultural diversity, diversity, which in turn cannot accommodate nationalism and its insistence on anonymity and equality. Nationalism is operational only within the distinguished group consisting of indistinguishable members. A distinctively hierarchical society does not exhibit this property of universalism and unanimity.

One may object that this in itself is not enough to validate the claim that an agricultural society consists of different cultures. For instance, French nobility and French peasants may not be two different cultures after all. And it may well have been the case that peasants valued honour as much as aristocrats did. Nonetheless, the important point is that the agricultural society tends to retain a strong sense of difference among its members, which implies a lack of identification and a lack of sense of solidarity so characteristic of nationalism. Culture in the agrarian world is not politically binding, nor is a political entity determined by cultural similarity. Consequently, the political form applicable to this diversity of culture could not be the one of nation-state.

Now, a modern society, an industrial/scientific society, is characterised by social mobility, anonymity and atomisation. These traits are a consequence of the modes of production capable of producing an excess. Technology and science offer solutions to the ailments of the agrarian society. However, in order to do this effectively it is a prerequisite to allow social mobility - free movement of individuals within the social and production structure. This movement is determined by the requirements posed by economy, by the criteria of economic efficiency. Retaining rigid hierarchical structures based on heredity in the industrial society is counter-productive. For this reason, social mobility is desideratum of the modern society. This means that leading positions within a modern society are occupied by those possessing required skill, knowledge, and expertise. A modern society is not hierarchical. It is meritorious.

This implies the egalitarian principle in the way that it was not the case in earlier periods. To be sure, there remains the difference in terms of wealth, merit and power between individuals. However, this difference is neither anchored in nor

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[i] *"Nationalism"* p. 20 ; Ernest Gellner

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legitimised by social and political structure. This form of equality implies anonymity. A society consists of many nameless and invisible individuals who cooperate in virtue of their skills and abilities, which subsequently has bearing on the communication.

As Gellner observes, bringing down a hierarchical structure of pre-modern age meant de-contextualisation. Meaning could no longer be determined by the recognisable social context, deeply imprinted into people's consciousness. Now, the communication had to take place in a rather abstract context, where the communicants never see each other. If communication is to be effective, it is necessary that its participant posses education. They must be skilled in using a common medium of communication. This requires a well-defined medium of communication, a standard procedure to encode and decode meaning. It requires standardised language. A society, which develops this ability, will eventually define its boundaries in terms of the similarity that rests on shared standards. It will start to pursue homogeneity. It will define its organisational form in such a way as to reinforce its political bond, which is the cultural homogeneity created partly out of linguistic uniformity. This is what explains nationalism writes Gellner.

Even though Gellner regards the modes of production as determinant of organisational form, he is also attentive to other functional elements involved in the rise of nationalism. Those elements concern the intellectual and moralistic background of European thought – culture in a broader sense. The argument goes like this. Philosophers of the Enlightenment period advocated individualism and freedom. This was a response to the Platonic ideal of justice, which consisted in everyone doing his share, where moral value is to affirm oneself in this way. The semantic of the Self in the Platonic scheme was determined by the position within the societal hierarchy. The Enlightenment, on the other hand, advocated individualism and formal equality of everyone. Morality consists in moral laws, accessible to all rational beings as rational beings. The Self was taken out of the social context, and affirmed in the virtue of its rational capacity. This implied diminution of the role of feeling in ethics. A moral person is the one who follows universal moral law. A sound moral judgment required disinterestedness.

This trend caused Romantic reaction, which marked the return to the old, forgotten values. Moral agents were again understood as ordinary people being capable of extraordinary things. True morality called for the capacity to feel, love and to commit

oneself emotionally to one's existence. Nietzsche "revealed" the illusion behind the belief that morality is about the law, impartiality, purity, disinterestedness etc. All of it, according to his *genealogy of morals* was an expression of the weak trying to secure a position that is more favourable by causing the strong to denounce his "sin" of strength. The truth is rather that desire underlies all moral acts, and that moral judgment is interiorised feeling of resentment of the oppressed. Nietzsche's nihilistic portrayal of European spirit came about the same time as Darwin's theory of evolution, which provided a biological perspective on most subjects previously treated exclusively by human sciences and philosophy. Nations became organic units, exposed to threats from without and from within – the threats that had to be eliminated if the society is to survive. This was also the time of the greatest impoverishment and the oppression of the working class, causing widespread bitterness and disappointment. When combined - the romantic reaction, moral disenchantment, return of the feeling, evolutionism and general discontent - these elements created a propitious context for the proliferation of nationalism in the sphere of ideas.

It is the specificity and not the anonymous universality that makes a bunch of people into a group. The exclusivity of the membership was expressed by sentiments – love for nation. The specificity was defined in term of roots. Nation-states are conceived as homogenous units, where all members have the same roots that make them both unique and alike. Moral agents followed no longer moral law, but instincts for survival that were secured through membership of the group. This emotional link, grounded in the concern for one's existence, inspired loyalty to the group and turned it into highest virtue. This cultural background tries to explain why nationalism understood primarily as an idea, was able to flourish in the middle of the 19th century.

To sum up, modes of production, science and technological change - these can be termed as an alteration of the physical reality - exerted the pressure on the old medieval world and its structure. This change had a deep impact on social reality, affecting modes of thinking as the literacy spread. New perspectives were adopted, making new ideas transparent and compelling. Hence, nationalism on this account has its physical and cultural background, but it most certainly does not have its antiquity. It belongs to modernity, to the era of profound changes affecting both living conditions and cultural expressions.

Anderson's view

In his book, *Imagined Communities,* Benedict Anderson defines nationalism as a cultural artefact of particular kind. According to him, a nation is an *imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign*[i]. There are several reasons for defining nation in this way. First, communities grow in size, so that their members never meet or get to know each other. They can only live as an imagined community, with the shared sense and image of their communion. Notwithstanding inequalities and oppression within, members of a nation think of themselves in terms of what Anderson calls *horizontal comradeship*. Another, more theoretical, reason is based on his criticism of Gellner's overemphasis on the nationalism's inventory function regarding culture and its political correlate – nation-state. The problem with this view is a tacit implication that opposed to "invented" nations, which constitute majority according to Gellner, there are also "true" nations. This way of demarcating nations (true and invented) runs a risk of settling the matter in advance by definition and not by historical evidence. It is more viable, according to Benedict, to distinguish them according to the way they imagine themselves as nations.

Furthermore, nations are imagined as *limited* simply because despite their enormous size and relatively flexible boundaries, nations are always conceived as having boundaries. In addition, since historically they belong to the decay of monarchism, nations are conceived as *sovereign* political units in no need of surrendering their sovereignty to anything foreign to it. After giving the definition of the nation that sets the frame for further historical search for evidence, Anderson undertakes an analysis of processes and transformations that enabled the rise of nationalism.

In agreement with Gellner, Anderson suggests that nationalism is to be explained in the light of the large cultural systems that preceded it. It must not be simply reduced to ideology of liberalism and its grip on the issue of political governance. It has roots in much deeper conditions where the culture can be viewed as their expression.

Historically, nationalism belongs to the era of the erosion of religious authority accompanied by a gradual erosion of dynastic realm. Both religion and its political ally, monarchism, had deep roots in people's consciousness. Religion established itself as an attempt to deal with the most fundamental issues of human

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[i] *"Imagined Communities"* p. 6 ; Benedict Anderson

existence – paradox of the contingency of human life. It tried to provide the meaning and continuity to the human existence. Monarchy, on the other side, was embodiment of the societal and political order (order of things indeed) as envisioned and proscribed by religion. When both religion and political form began to experience the deterioration of their privileged positions in people's hearts and minds the void emerged. It was the void of unfulfilled promises of continuity and meaning, and nationalism purported to fill it. Enlightenment thinkers speeded up this diminuendo of religious authority. They, however, placed all too big and seemingly unbearable weight of forlornness, responsibility and senselessness on the individual. The situation in which people of the late 17th century found themselves in urged for new solutions to the old problems. This pervasiveness and pressing weight of the problems represents the linkage of nationalism and culture. It represents its cultural roots. Hence, nationalism cannot be dissociated from the cultural context that surrounded it, providing the frame for its understanding.

On Anderson's account, two things contributed to the decline of religious authority and monarchism. One was the encounter with other cultures and other religions; the other was the gradual substitution of universal language of truth (Latin, Arabic) with vernaculars. Religion was until the Middle Ages binding principle of empires and kingdoms. It cut across different linguistic and ethnic communities, bolstering the firm bonds from the central political authority to the periphery. This centralism was further strengthened through the use of a single dominant language of religious (divine) truth. The literate minority of priests, who knew both local dialects and the language of truth, occupied this intermediary stratum. This established the hierarchy and the power-relation that lasted for millennia.

Early encounters with infidels inspired feelings of affiliation. Members of different concessions begun to express tendency towards the territorialistion of the religion. This was the first step towards fragmentation, first politically significant splitting of political consciousness, even though it is perhaps misleading to talk of political consciousness in the Middle Ages. Anyway, early records of travellers to the Far East witness to this[i]. The important moment is the demarcation between "us" and "them" in terms of exclusive belonging to the one of the irreconcilable sides. The argument suggests that once the process of fragmentation begun, it did not have to stop at the level at which it started. It was always possible to find something distinctively

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[i] Anderson refers to Marco Polo's letters and journals.

"ours" in order to continue the fragmentation. The idea that the cultural distinctiveness ought to be linked with the political form and political boundaries became inscribed in people's consciousness.

Another thing contributing to the abovementioned decline is a gradual decrease in using a single universal language of truth. As time went on the local vernaculars became a primary means of conveying the meaning and communicating with the members of the same linguistic group. This development further bolstered a sense of membership of the limited group linked to a more or less definite territory. The abandonment of universal language furthered the development of vernaculars, increasing their capacity to express abstractions. Soon, local languages were capable of expressing religious massages and ideas of ancient thinkers as well as those contemporary of Enlightenment period. The development of languages implied that new new modes of apprehending reality could be acquired by a language community. Hence, communities could eventually come to understand themselves differently.

One of the fundamental transformations of the apprehensive modus effectuated through the use of vernaculars concerned time. As novels and newspapers of the late 15th and 16th century reveal, the conception of temporality has changed from an abstract unity of the past and the present contained in the eternal moment of truth (divine temporal perspective) to the calendrical homogenous, empty time. The main difference concerned simultaneity. The calendrical conception of temporality sees events in succession, as chains. The simultaneity is then a coincidence of two events in the same, essentially empty time. This shift in time perspective opened for the possibility of experiencing continuity of existence as a myriad of simultaneities. All members of the community coincided with each other – they shared the same local world consisting of the net of interactions, shared symbols, common means of identification, familiar places, events, etc. From the perspective of the novel, members of the community made up the audience, which was able to recognise themselves and their similarity. Newspapers exploited this sense of internal linkage of audience and writer, the linkage possible only in a homogenous time. They were day-to-day novels, which perpetuated a feeling of communion of members sharing the same language and same everydayness. This made it possible to imagine community, that is, to develop the sense of sharing a habitat with invisible others, who are similar to oneself.

Hence, the certainties of the old order became uncertain, urging thereby for a new conception of social and political reality. Nationalism, as suggested above, came to exploit this possibility by creating surrogate certainties.

As regards the debate about historical origin of nationalism, it is clear that Anderson places it in connection with the conceptual renewal generated by the ideas of Enlightenment. Anderson's main concern was to explain the fertility of the ground where the ideology of nationalism flourished. Nevertheless, he is no less sensitive to the role of the technological and the economic development – capitalism and print – that provided a technical support to the diffusion of nationalism.

However, according to Anderson, print was more than a technical support that perpetuated nationalism. It is the *key for the generation of the new idea of simultaneity*[i]. Print could not do it alone. It was rather interplay of print and economic concerns for profit that propelled the transformation, which, when it came, represented movement toward nationalism. Printing and selling books became profit-making business, which in search for more profit had to turn to a greater audience. The monoglot audience, an audience that spoke only vernacular and not Latin, was by far the greatest in number. Hence, printing in vernacular soon became widespread[ii].

Reformation boosted this development, and here one can see how the print and political concerns worked together, exploiting and reinforcing each other. This however, led to a further fragmentation of once unified Christian western Empire. However, in order to be feasible, printing in vernacular had to be able to reach the broadest audience possible. The audience itself was linguistically heterogonous, using numberless dialects. Printing urged to reduce the number of dialects, by imposing a single and more embracing language – an official language of the larger group. The result was that the linguistic fragmentation was transposed into political fragmentation, which affected larger units making them heterogeneous, while turning smaller units into linguistically compact entities. This development, together with the abovementioned apprehension of simultaneity, created a recognisably nationalistic perspective.

There are obvious parallels and similarities in Gellner's and Anderson's views. Both of them stressed the importance of the deployment of vernaculars. Vernaculars served as means of inducing and diffusing new ideas, ideas that were not

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[i] *"Imagined Communities"* p. 37 ; Benedict Anderson
[ii] Anderson refers to *"Coming of the book"* by Fabvre and Martin, which claims that 200.000.000 books were printed by 1600.

burdened by the "truth of revelation" and monopolised by clergy and Latin. This could not work without spread of literacy. Both of them see cultural context as decisive, and nationalism on their account could be best explained on the historical stage of ideas and their interplay. However, the matter is not resolved by ideas alone, and both of them see changes of underlying material reality as equally important. According to Gellner, forms of cultural expression, organisational forms and the entire social life are determined by modes of production. Anderson's claim is less universalistic, but nevertheless follows the basically same trajectory. He insists that technological development and economic conditions made nationalism both possible and historical. Of course, the ideology of nationalism had to have a good recipient, but that recipient herself was a product of the same transformation that occurred in the sphere of economics and technology (science and industry).

For these reasons, they both agree that nationalism belongs to modernity. Gellner's assertion that the culture is intrinsically human and social may seem as suggesting that nationalism after all may have its antiquarian past. Anderson likewise points to fundamental human conditions of meaning and existence, and connects it with the expression this condition can assume within the cultural context. This can perhaps be red as saying that nationalism was embryonic since the dawn of human kind. However, this is misleading. Both of them clearly place nationalism in the modern era.

Difficulties with the modernist view

Both Gellner and Anderson are aware of some of difficulties their views face. Linking nationalism to industrial development and spread of literacy does not work for all nationalistic movements. Nationalistic transformation in central and east Europe was different in both outlook and outcome. Neither of the required conditions exited in Balkans nor in former colonies. Anderson is aware that the linguistic factor has limited explanatory scope. Cases of South and North America are instructive in this regard. Population in Spanish and English colonies in America, population which is to become a constituent of new nations, shared the same language. By the time nationalism arrived on the political arena, most of the nascent nations were agrarian societies, with a small percentage of literacy. Anderson's suggestion is that other factors were in play. These factors were essentially political and economic struggle for control, xenophobic

segregation and fear of revolution. That is, all of the "extraneous" factors determining and bolstering nationalism have something to do with power. Nonetheless, Anderson does not pursue this train of thought to the full. He is content with indicating these other factors, without embedding them in the theory of the causes of nationalism.

Gellner's use of auxiliary hypothesis is perhaps even more unsatisfactory. He too is aware of the inapplicability of his theory to cases of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. These national movements satisfied none of conditions suggested by the theory (social mobility, developed industry, literacy), but their fight for freedom was nevertheless carried in the spirit of nationalism. In order to remedy this apparent incongruence of data with the theory, Gellner identifies two aspects of these insurgence movements, which transformed rebellious activity of bandits into a movement for national liberation. One aspect concerns religion - most subjugated groups, with the exception of Albanians, were Christians. Being Christian implied receptiveness for the already established ideology of nationalism in the west. Conductivity of religion (or lack of the same) explains also why the Ottomans, who controlled most of Balkan Peninsula, were unaffected by the secular ideology and spiritual streaming originating in the Christian world. In other words, the idea of nationalism moved from the west to the Christian east, and found the fertile ground in the long tradition of rebellious movement against oppressing infidels. Cultural and religious differences between the oppressed and the oppressor, which have persisted for over 500 years, provided the platform for nationalism. Thus, rebellions transformed into wars of national liberation and outlaws became ideologists, without the presence of literacy, leading stratum of intelligentsia and urgent need for transformation imposed by rising industry. Still, Gellner simply asserts that despite this apparent deviance from the general pattern of nationalism, the thesis remains in force, since it is affirmed by many other examples.

Anderson's solution to the incongruence of date and theory in the case of the Balkans, East Europe, Indochina and Americas goes along the same lines. He explains nationalism of non-industrial nations, which in addition lacked high culture, in terms of copying ideas. He writes about French Revolution becoming the thing, something visible and as such, something that could be copied. With some minor changes it can be applied to areas that otherwise lack impetus for national transformation coming from within. In other words, nationalism can be engineered and conducted after a plan.

Both these solutions have been criticised by, among others John Gledhill, who writes that the lack of a clear causal link in this *ad hock* explanation leaves unanswered the question; *if nationalism in Eastern Europe was the product of pure imitation, why was the form of nationalism that spread East qualitatively different to the civic form of nationalism that emerged during the Enlightenment in Western Europe*?[i]

However, probably the major disadvantage of Gellner's account (Anderson's too) is the ease with which he evades the question of how homogenous cultural platform in those first European nations was formed. According to Gellner, nationalism means a marriage between culture and state. In the section seven, Gellner reels off different forms of nationalism in terms of difference in formative processes, due to variance in historical circumstances. Each nation in creating itself by wedding of culture to state had to face different obstacles. The main obstacle was the absence of similarity of culture, language, shared values and customs. The nations inhabiting Atlantic coast (he termed it the first zone of nationalism), by the time they entered the era of nationalism, have already had a comparatively stable and defined platform of cultural uniformity. The diversity within was insufficient to cause greater troubles. Hence, Gellner simply presupposes national homogeneity, which as he writes, was achieved through a thousand years of merging of different ethnic groups, whose roots somehow grew together. This long process has prepared the ground for nationalism's advance, so the transformation was smooth and without violence. Gellner seems to be neglecting what constitutes the focal point of Marx's analysis (topic of the next chapter), namely, the exclusory politic in pre-modern nationalism.

In what he termed the second zone of nationalism – central Europe and Italy – he writes that relatively high cultural and linguistic uniformity existed prior to the political unification. He even says that this area of nationalist transformation *had no inherent need to go nasty*[ii]. In the same passage, he claims that the third zone, east European zone, was predestined to a violent and ugly passage from one political form to the other. In which manner the transformational process will progress depends more on circumstances, and less on the nationalism itself.

This kind of claim implies that nationalism is both developmental and inventory. The difference between zones reflects the difference in obstacles posed

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[i] *National Identities* (Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2005, pp. 347-368)
[ii] *"Nationalism"* p. 54; Ernest Gellner

before the same task of marrying culture and political form. In the east of Europe, neither culture nor organisational form, painlessly matching each other, were present. They had to be created. This involved cultural engineering and political struggle, resulting in periods of violent antagonism – the ethnic nationalism and its exclusory practices. In the west, the rise of nationalism assumes the form of gradual transformation, a sort of maturing of national and political consciousness. However, nationalism in neither of cases is seen as a process of power-formation.

Implications for the modernist vs. primordialist debate

The abovementioned difficulty regarding the dichotomy between the ethnic and the civic nationalism can be transcribed in the modernist/primordialist debate. It is helpful to warn here, as Gellner does, that primodrialist view can easily be confused with the outright cultural engineering so characteristic of "primitive" nationalism. Hardcore nationalists often engage in projects of establishing historical continuity between modern nation and its ancestry. They tend to interpret the past to suit this purpose, and are not reluctant to invent it. For them, the primordialist view is a matter of course. However, this is not what an adherent of primordialist view has to be committed to. He actually must not embrace this approach, if he is to have a "genuine" theoretical explanation of nationalism. As Gellner himself emphasised, when a hardcore nationalist tries to explain nationalism, he typically remains confined to the context of his culture, and to his political end. In this way, he can at best explain the specificity of his nation's nationalism, but cannot offer a general explanation applicable to other cases. Primordialist view, if it is to have theoretical weight, must explain nationalism in general terms. A primordialist must investigate the process of nation-formation, its causes; he must be able to offer general patterns, which nationalism follows whenever it is at work in some culture, the linkages between culture and its organisational forms etc. He must explain why and how, as historical facts undoubtedly reveal, culture became a political principle, causing culture and the political body to overlap. Furthermore, since he insists on nationalism having antiquity, he must explain this as a continuous process, whose early phases can be distinguished from later ones while the process itself still can be seen as continuous. Now, given that the culture is primordial (initial presupposition) and that it is prone to more rapid transformation than the one genetically programmed, it

is difficult to uphold the hypothesis claiming that the cultural continuity exists despite significant changes. Cultures sometimes change beyond recognition. If nationalism is just one expression of culture (a cultural trait) then it too can change. It can vanish and it might as well never originate in the first place.

A modernist, like Gellner, is not denying that culture exists continuously - that people are always endowed with some sort of cultural aspect of their communal life is another initial presuppositions – but he denies that the relation between the culture and the organisational form has always been nationalistic in its outlook. Culture and organisation coexist symbiotically. Culture can provide the ground for a new organisational form but only if it has changed itself. And it changes at the same time as it feels the need for a new organisational form. This is what happened in most European countries, and despite the evidence to the contrary, this is the general pattern leading to the rise of nationalism. Hence, the main point of modernists is that nationalism, despite being firmly linked to the continuity of culture, it is nevertheless distinguished from earlier periods by its own distinct constellation of culture and organisational form. For this reason, it seems plausible to talk of the birth of nationalism.

Furthermore, since nationalism is culture, it can be created in the sense that the transformation, which some culture experiences can be started, conducted, speeded up, brought to a stall etc. This is clearly a creationistic view of nationalism.

There is theoretical side to this claim. If the history is to make any sense, it is important to be able to demarcate different periods and different phenomena. Nationalism of the modern era is clearly distinct and new in comparison to what was before. Thus, in order to understand past events, events far removed form today, it is of no use to impose perspectives of today. The war between the Persians and the Greeks is different from that of Iraq and Iran, even though they share many common features. There is even a greater difference between Peloponnesian wars and Spanish civil war.

A primoridalist seems to suggest that there is something about nationalism, which is pertinent to the humans as much as the culture is, and that culture and nationalism go hand in hand, even if this was not always clearly acknowledged. In order to uphold this view it is crucial to prove that nationalism is so essential to culture and to one's existence. It is important to provide the evidence that it has always been present, and that despite changing perspectives and different grids of intelligibility employed at earlier times, nationalism remains unmistakeably pervasive and evident.

Gellner denies that there is such evidence, apart from the very dubious one presented by nationalists engaged in local historico-cultural engineering. He admits however that there is evidence that certain cultural features have persisted unchanged over the time. As he says, culture proved to be both tenacious and volatile[i]. However, nationalism-prone cultures, with the established historical continuity, constitute a minority. The greatest part of today's nations was borne at some point between 1775 and 2008.

It seems then that the debate between the two opposing camps comes down to the definition of the relation between nationalism and culture. If these two are coextensive, then the culture is defined as a nation, and *vice versa*. That is, if they are equiprimordial, then all the talk of primordiality of nationalism is warranted. Different political forms are not decisive for the nationalism. It is there, it has always been there, irrespective of whether people lived in monarchy, democracy, aristocracy etc. The problem however remains that evidence counts against it, unless one resorts to the convenient reinterpretation or outright invention of historical evidence. If however, one contends, as modernist does, that nationalism is not intrinsic feature of culture, let alone equiprimordial, then it is relegated to one of its forms, or perhaps to the cultural property denoting the relation of culture and organisation. Much of the evidence counts in favour of such a view, even though not all of it fits neatly into the theory. In any case, nationalism on this account is a fairly recent phenomenon.

In the following I will present Marx's view, which suggest the solution to many of the difficulties Gellner's and Anderson's theories face. It also provides a new perspective for looking at the nationalism, the perspective of power.

Marx's view

Faith in Nation is Anthony Marx's book on nationalism with a rather instructive subtitle, *Exclusory origins of nationalism*. No less instructive is his definition of Nationalism – *it is political sentiment of popular solidarity intended to coincide with the states, distinct from analysis of its emergent causes and effects*. Although fully aware of shortcomings of such a vague definition (vague and imprecise in empirical terms), Marx insists on it, because it comprises not only modern and fully developed forms of national states and nationalism, but it also captures the formation process of

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[i] *"Nationalism"* p. 94; Ernest Gellner

nationalism and the mechanism that guides it. It comprises what he perceives as essential to nationalism – an effort to create popular support to state-power.

Even though one can speak of nationalism and state without the presence of nation-state forming the pair, or one can also speak of states that have been formed independently of nationalism, it does not change the fact that nationalism intends the State. Nationalism strives for institutionalised political power that is all encompassing in relation to numerous institutions already existing in society. This distinguishes nationalism from other popular movements that do not have a political goal.

This definition suggests that nationalism had already been present long before the rise of capitalism, literacy and liberalism. Marx actually speaks of *protonationalism*. Hence, nationalism is not confined to its modern forms expressed in the idea of homogenous nation-state resting on the ideological platform of liberalism. Nationalism refers to the process of establishing identification amongst members of different social, ethnic and religious groups ruled by a single political body. That body may be monarch or government. It makes no difference, since the essence of nationalism is creation of unity within the group in order to secure loyalty and obedience, but more importantly to gain allegiance from the members. It is at bottom process of power-formation and power-solidification.

Since nationalism describes the process, one has to be aware of different degrees of national unity, which suited different political forms and different political agenda. In agreement with Gorski, Marx writes that *instead of drawing sharp distinction between (formative) protonationalism and fully developed nationalism…we should focus on variations in the intensity and the scope of nationalist mobilisation*[i]. Theoretical implication of this view is that it challenges correctness and validity of drawing sharp distinction between the civic and the ethnic nationalism. According to Marx, the process of nation-formation contains both elements – inclusion and exclusion – deployed in generating new and rearranging already existing power-alliances.

Marx rejects the thesis that nationalism was a literary trope resting on shared language and possibility of communication. It is true that communication was necessary in order to create the feeling of solidarity and the sense of sameness among members sharing the same language, but this theoretical stipulation lacks historical support. Literacy was too limited to make print into a unifying power-factor. He equally

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[i] *"Faith in Nation"* p. 8; Anthony Marx

refuses as historically inadequate the claim that nationalism grew on the basis of pre-existing ethnic unity, something Gellners takes for granted in demarcating the zones of nationalism (see page 71). According to Gellner's hypothesis, nationalism based on already existing ethnic or religious unity can be viewed as a sort of superstructure – a higher-level political affirmation of the group unity.

However, in this view nationalism seems to be deprived of its unifying function, something Marx dismisses as historically and theoretically incorrect. Ethnic homogeneity or blood kinship did not exist at the time of the emerging national states. Ethnic unity based on blood ties could not operate across great distances, especially in the context where ethnic diversity has been an important factor. Consequently, he denies that the rise of capitalism, (standard education, social mobility) is sufficient to account for the rise of nationalism. Capitalism did help consolidate the state power, but it flourished in places lacking previous homogeneity characteristic of nationalism. However, it also created social cleavages strong enough to tear society apart. The reason why some countries managed to deploy and utilise the cohesive force of nationalism - force that proved to be stronger than any other - cannot be due to the capitalism alone. It is also difficult to explain how the passionate commitment so characteristic to nationalism could be forged solely on economic interest and mutual benefits arising form the profit-oriented concerns. Marx's refusal of these factors, which were decisive on Gellner's and Anderson's account, may seem a bit puzzling. But one should keep in mind that he places the origin of nationalism some two centuries prior to French Revolution. This creates the problem for previously treated theories, and Marx formulates it as a question of whether states created the nation or *vice versa*. This formulation is foregone by his understanding of nationalism.

Marx's solution is that these two processes - state building and nation building – were parallel and intertwined. State did have economic and political interests in deploying a mechanism that may act cohesively in order to consolidate its power, but this top-down attempts in forging nation were limited in strength and efficiency. Ruling elites had the leading role in this process, but the tempo and the final outcome of their efforts depended upon the social context in which nationalism had to operate. The spread of literacy and the development of economic ties did not coincide with the cultural division, nor has the cultural identification coincide with the state boundaries. Expressed metaphorically, if the state had given the incitement to the creation of nation

by consolidating its power through allegiance, the outcome depended on the "material" available. This means that the formative process of nations did not rule out exclusory policies in advance. Both exclusions and inclusions had a role to play in efforts to forge unified population and remove elements threatening its cohesion. As Marx indicates, nationalism followed the logic of *exclusory cohesion*[i]. His claim is based on the interpretation of the transformation occurring in France, England and Spain in period 1500-1800. Let's have a brief look at them.

Since the end of the 15th century, European monarchs have been actively engaged in projects of centralising power and securing allegiance from commoners. In this early period, religion offered itself as an effective means of dividing in order to create more cohesive parts (unity). However, the main problem with religion was that it for a long time remained apolitical. It was indifferent to secular concerns for political power, and a characteristically religious zealot could not be so easily transposed into political solidarity. Religion, it was commonly understood, dealt with otherworldly issues. Hence, it had to be politicalised. However, popular support implied empowering a commoner by inducing political conscience. However, the allocating of political power meant that the popular support could easily turn into antagonism. This meant that the popular allegiance was two-edged sword. It was desired for the solidification and the centralisation of power, but nonetheless had a centrifugal tendency. For that reason, government faced a continual problem of developing strategies that could create more stable unity. Initial exploitation of religious divisions had to move to a higher and more secularised level, where the political had a full force.

Religion, however, had the advantage that it appealed to broad masses, and thus was able to generate popular support. It was especially noticeable in England, where Reformation represented political decision targeting political power. The effect of Protestantism was the isolation of England from continental powers, which in turn functioned as unifying force. Religious fervour nourished unity and gave impetus to the rise of national identity. Thus, mass political engagement in England was borne on hatred towards the Rome, which in part popularly defined what it meant to be an Englishman. The significance of Protestantism and the religious intolerance that grew over time cannot be downplayed. Its crescendo was reached in the Revolution, when the Parliament managed to secure the support from the masses that were frightened by the

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[i] *"Faith in Nation"* p. 24; Anthony Marx

prospect of the king conspiring against his own people in an attempt to reconstitute Catholicism. Predominantly protestant parliament tried to limit king's absolutism, and it may be argued that religious fears were a disguise for the conquest of power. But it is precisely here that the religious fanaticism proved to be a very effective means of mobilising mass support. Hatred and aggressive attitude toward Catholicism and Catholic minority in England and Ireland was so deeply rooted in the Protestant majority. Its explosive force was exploited in bolstering unity through oppression of Catholics, Irish and Scots. In the end, it went so far as to end with the regicide.

In English case, the proliferation of the political and creation of the sense of nationhood started from below. It actually started with Henri VIII decision to lock out Rome from the Island and to allocate Rome's privileges to the local nobility, but it was solidified in political terms when the masses embraced it. England's might was born through power operating on micro-level and exploiting medium of religion.

French example also bears witness to the fact that provoking religious animosity – this is what the kings and the elite did in France throughout the 16th century – had the effect of engaging the masses into a political conflict. In France, the religious fervour was guided by priests and lords towards religious intolerance and outright hatred. The violence exploding in bloody conflicts between the Protestant minority and the Catholic majority reached its peak in the massacre of the St. Bartholomew's Day on the August 24, 1572. The massacre was orchestrated from above in an attempt to politically disable Huguenots for good, precluding thereby a possibility of future civil wars. What was intended to be selective murdering of the Protestant noblemen, who were potential political aspirators to the crown, soon turned into an uncontrollable mass killing undertaken by the mob. Broad participation affirmed the mass engagement, while the hatred and the zealot evidenced the seriousness of the commitment to the national cause. This smoothed the path for national solidarity by anchoring the sense of solidarity in the consciousness of commoners. It shaped political consciousness by imprinting the idea of Frenchness, whose central element was Catholicism. Purposefully inspired religious fanaticism transformed into a secular struggle for the crown, as the catholic majority saw in the crown the political guarantee of stability and security. Hence, it was through civil wars and intolerant sectarianism of both masses and elites that the absolutism of the French monarchy was built. As Marx concludes, *Catholic majority support for the crown was forged on the basis of attacks on Huguenots,*

establishing a pattern of exclusionary popular cohesion that the next French king would find a powerful force to resist[i]. The long-term effect of wedding political power handed to commoners with their sense of religious identity was French nationalism.

The project of creating Spain started from above, and was carried by the only institution, which had legitimacy to act throughout the unified kingdoms of Castile and Aragon – the *Inquisition*. Both Ferdinand and Isabelle saw the opportunity presented in the Inquisition and tried to exploit it. The only strong bond existing at the time and possessing unifying potentiality was religion. This meant the politicalisation of the religion in order to mobilise popular adherence and loyalty to the centre. However, this also meant the inflaming and stirring the antagonism against the alien groups purposefully used in the project of solidification of power. The group most exposed to this antagonism were Jews. There exited a long tradition of oppression and enmity toward Jews supplemented with different forms of segregation. However, the antagonism reached its peak in the act of the expulsion of Jews in 1492. The same ill fortune befell Moors and other smaller groups destined to perish.

Despite the disagreement as to what an extent Isabelle foresaw the significance of Inquisition, seen in retrospective the Inquisition made the crucial contribution to the creation of political unity of Spain. It was at the time the only institution that had the authority over the entire territory of Spain. After the Pope granted a full control over the Inquisition to the Spanish crown, its influence grew even bigger. The Inquisition helped create the platform on which the unity of Spain rested and could be further expanded later. The platform was primarily strong religious sentiment transferred to the sphere of the political. The sense of national unity grew out of religious unity, achieved largely by the persecution and the expulsion of foreign elements. This religious basis defined the foundations of Spanish national identity.

However, Spain soon ran out of scapegoats, and in the absence of "others" (heretics), the initial impact of Inquisition diminished, leaving the national identity a half cooked meal. The dominantly catholic population had no longer a reason to engage in military conflicts on religious grounds. It likewise had neither "others" against whom it may confirm its own national uniqueness. This resulted, concludes Marx, in an underdeveloped feeling of national unity and emphasised regionalism. The Inquisition did solidify the central authority from above, but it did not produce genuine national

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[i] *"Faith in Nation"* p. 94; Anthony Marx

solidarity from below. This was a pragmatic consequence of the only countrywide institution that endowed the state authority with similar scope of political power.

The examples above reveal how divisions and sectarianism were utilised in bolstering state authority while at same time paving the way for creation of a homogenous national body. Exclusory politics were pursued and discriminative laws enacted. This stresses the necessity of such practices for the formation of national unity, as a precondition for prosperity, stability and security of the population. However, there have been periods of toleration and peaceful coexistence of different religious groups. In France, during Henry IV, periods of active inclusive politics culminated with the *Edict of Nantes* in 1598. Corresponding act in England is the *Declaration of Breda*, issued in 1660 by Charles II in the time of Restoration of monarchy. However, analysing the reasons behind the attempts at relative toleration in interregnums, Marx concludes that the main concern was the solidification of central power in the aftermath of civil wars. It was the fear of anarchy and insecurity - additionally aggravated in England by the regicide - that prompted elites and monarchs to restore order and peace by pursuing the politics of peaceful coexistence. Hence, purely pragmatic reasons grounded in concerns for political power urged the ruling elites to shift from one strategy to another as they judged it as the most suitable at the time. Liberal ideas had no real say in this case.

Marx concludes on the page 139, that relative toleration was possible on the basis of previous consolidation accomplished through bloodbaths and persecution of excluded groups. Inclusive policies were soon abandoned, appearing to be single episodes, an exception to the rule. The politics of stoking animosity and deepening societal cleavages could not be dispensed with so easily in attempts to secure allegiance and solidify power. Toleration proved to be premature, and it later boosted antagonisms and discord. In his concluding chapter, Marx writes that *nationalism emerged when masses were invited onto the political stage or invited themselves in. But that invitation did not come inclusively from books, enrichment or schooling but rather from sectarian conflicts, enraging sermons and callings. The passions of faith were the stuff of which the passions for the state were built*[i].

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[i] *"Faith in Nation"* p. 197; Anthony Marx

Theoretical implications of Marx's interpretation

Historical analysis of Spain, England and France must not be confused with the theoretical analysis of nationalism. It is stipulated that nationalism is a political project of intensification of the power. As such, it is guided by the same mechanism on which power operates. Hence, in order to understand nationalism it is essential to have an adequate conception of power. Historical examples Marx gave suggest that this is how nationalism is to be understood. Yet, it may also seem that historical examples are forced into the "power-frame".

Anyway, Marx's theory appears to be the schematic representation of inner logic and necessity of nationalism. On his account, nation is dependent on a smaller scale sense of identity and solidarity. It is by firmly establishing the core constituency as fundament that the later national superstructure can be safely erected. Ruling elites often had to make the choice which an ethnic or a religious group is to be constitutive. Sadly, the conclusion is that only through selective solidarity accompanied by violence could a genuine national sentiment of political solidarity emerge. This means that a civic/ethnic distinction in terms of inclusiveness and exclusiveness cannot be dichotomous. The Question of "either or" is theoretically misleading.

One may object that Marx is making too much of those turbulent periods that preceded the modern era. Neither Gellner nor Anderson denied that the struggle for power played a role for the rise of nationalism. But, the question is where to draw the line in an attempt to delineate the phenomenon of nationalism. In order to do it satisfactorily, one has to identify the essential features of nationalism. Well, it is easier said than done. Besides, it is not the ambition of this study to finally settle the issue of nationalism.

Marx seems quite confident in applying the method of viewing social transformation through the prism of power. He explains both ethnic and civic nationalism without resorting to cultural background, capitalism, industrial development etc. For instance, he writes that towards the French revolution, the idea of inclusive national unity was strongly re-emerging. However, the reason for religious tolerance stems from the fact that religion was equated with the crown, and as such represented a legitimate target in the eyes of the Third Estate. Hence, the religious tolerance was an ideological weapon. In addition to that, Protestantism for a long time did not pose a

genuine threat, since majority of Huguenots has been either killed or expelled. The strong sense of unity has simply been taken for granted by the masses, which means that toleration and inclusiveness were possible due to previous practices of exclusion

One could easily extend this argument to explain the relative inclusiveness of the post-war nationalism, at last in the west. Once the unity is firmly established, a political group begins to exhibit a tendency towards inclusiveness. Such a tendency can be understood from the perspective of biopolitics. Every political group strives for strength, which is partly determined by its size. Thus, the strength consists in the capacity of the group to generate and assimilate as many members as possible without compromising its cohesiveness. In biopolitical jargon, it is the immunity toward inner deceases. Citizenship is designed to deal with this potential danger by discriminating against those members whose presence presents a potential source for domestic disturbance. Hence, inclusiveness is the sign of population's vitality and strength.

As regards the origins of nationalism, it may appear that Marx's is closer to the primordialist view, but for different reasons. He is not equating nationalism with culture. Nor is it the love for one' culture, where both love and culture have always been present. But this is no more than appearance. He does acknowledge the fact that nationalism and nation-state have their historical birth, or as Gellner's put it, have their navels. When understood in terms of power, one is perhaps tempted to think that nationalism is as old as humanity, because political groups always strove for power and in the process, they always emphasised the sense of uniqueness against "Others". But this is conceptually misleading and nationalism also in Marx's view is a distinctive historico-political category, and as such has its distinctive historical place. Nationalism cannot be dissociated from nation-state, since that is what it intends. Term nation cannot be correctly applied to Greek polis, even though Pericle's speeches may be rendered Greek nationalism, which engendered the sense of Hellenistic unity.

Compatibility of Marx's view with the political theories of Schmitt and Agamben

On Marx's account, everything regarding nationalism can be reduced to power-relations and the strategies for forging new alliances. However, by pursuing this strategy one seems always to end precisely where one started. This in no way adds to the strength of the interpretative method. It makes it appear circular. This circularity

reflects back on the conception of power, which is central to it. The conception is, needless to say, the one developed by Foucault. Furthermore, this interpretative method relaying on power seems to be powerful enough to supply the explanation by itself, without considering its coherence with other related theories. Because of this, one could and should add to its defence some further theoretical considerations regarding sovereignty and psychology. This is what Marx did.

Marx's argument for the necessity of exclusory practices is aided by the observation of psychological traits of humans as social beings. Members of a group exist as members in virtue of self-identification and mutual recognition. This in turn is based on either blood-bonds or shared common history, values, culture and means of communication. The strongest bonds, however, is the feeling of solidarity. The feeling of solidarity is augmented when the group faces an enemy. This suggests that in order to create a homogenous group it is often advisable to deepen the already existing division, for thereby to reinforce the unity of the group by making individual members feel the need for solidarity. Hence, it is by inducing fears that the unity is bolstered. The same point is expressed by the psycho-analyst Jacques Lacan who eloquently explained that the fear of discomfort and uneasiness stems from the perception of being overwhelmed by nameless but potentially large flows, hordes, masses and streams of the Other that threaten to negate, delete, and empty the own and known world[i] (Lacan 2004);

This psychological observation can be transposed into the field of political theory. Marx actually made the reference to Schmitt's claim made in *The Concept of the Political* that a*n enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity*". "Collecitvity" in the quote suggests that an enemy is a foreign intrusion, but Schmitt makes his position on this issue quite clear – an internal enemy is no less an enemy. This suggests that the political, which is the bearer of sovereignty, is forged through the enmity. And forging the political is forging the nation-state through clash with the enemy. Recall that Marx's definition of nationalism says that nationalism always intends the state.

Although Marx only makes a sporadic reference to Schmitt, the agreement between Schmitt's political theory and Marx's account of nationalism goes even further. Similar agreement can be observed between Agamben and Marx. I think it is worth

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[i] See *The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU* by Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers (2007 Editorial Board of *Antipode*.)

exploring it a bit more, since it gives additional strength to his interpretation by playing on the idea implicit in the historico-political discourse – relation of instrumentality between historical analysis and political theory.

Sovereignty is according to Schmitt a state's capacity to suspend laws and right of citizens – to decide on the exception. It is the monopoly on the political - the very same capacity to suspend the laws in times when an imminent danger of annihilation obtains. Such a danger may come both from outside and from within. Recognising it means recognising the enemy (inner or outer). Such enemy is to be excluded, expelled or eradicated. Marx's contention seems to be that the list of events ranging from St. Bartholomew's day to KZ camps contains the acts of sovereign power operating behind the glass walls of laws and rights. These events were not mere lags or isolated incidents, but the necessary component of sovereign power establishing itself through a creation of power-alliances. This is what nationalism is about.

One cannot help observing the link between Marx's term *exclusory cohesion* and Agamben's formulation of the juridical status of citizen as *inclusive exclusion*. Citizen-rights given through the citizenship were a subject to sovereign power. The sovereign power was defined as power to suspend the laws, which otherwise guarantees rights to members of the state. Agamben wrote that camps are paradigm of sovereign power today. In his comment on Arendt's observation that refugees today represent a major problem for nation states (decline of nation-state), and for humanity in general, Agamben concludes that the reason for this lies in the way citizenship is formulated[i]. What lies at the core of citizenship is nativity (birth), or a bare life, as Agamben had put it in his book *Homo Sacer*. A refugee is a stateless man. He is a man without citizenship, because he broke the sacred link of *nativity-territoriality-nationality*, something that nationalism has determined as the core element of nationhood. His legal status is of not belonging to any nation. The problem here is not his refusal or inability to assimilate into the new nation, while declining formal protection of his former state. The problem lies in the fact that by being deprived of citizenship he is deprived of civil rights. Although citizenship was designed to secure rights to a man, the man only serves as (vanishing) substrate for the citizen. Te citizen is the exclusive bearer of human rights.

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[i] Agamben, Symposium, 1995

Likewise, by being de-territorialized he is at the same time denationalised. Denationalisation is, however, a sovereign right of the state, which is exercised against those committing an act of treason (any kind of anti-national act will do), or simply regarded as "unworthy of citizenship". Beginning with WW1, a number of European countries enacted laws permitting de-naturalisation of its citizens. As Agamben reminds us, one procedure meticulously observed during the execution of "Final solution" was that *only after the Jews and gypsies were completely denationalized (even of that second-class citizenship that belonged to them after the Nuremberg laws) could they be sent to the extermination camps. When the rights of man are no longer the rights of the citizen, then he is truly sacred, in the sense that this term had in archaic Roman law: destined to die[i]*.

Today, the picture is essentially the same. Religious, racial and ethnic discrimination persists in "civic nations". Citizenship is conditioned upon assimilation and integration. The fact that these conditions are often formulated in economic terms only conceals the fact of exclusory policies based on racial and religious intolerance. To be sure, conditioning rights upon the employment is not only a subtle expression of xenophobia, but has its genuine biopolitical reasons. It is true that the selective exclusion form citizenship is issued from economic and biopilitical concerns, having their footing in the doctrine of neo-liberalism. Eligibility to citizenship is conditioned upon economic soundness, making the citizenship into an object of trade. Immigrant workers rendered an investment receive a favourable legal status compared to refugees. Contemporary EU's immigration policies are carefully designed for the selective import of labour and rejection of marked-redundant immigrants[ii]. Indeed, the decrease in the number of asylum seekers is considered political success in many EU member states.

However, the very same political decision reflecting economic considerations often enjoys broad backing in population, which is obtained through rhetoric stalking and latent xenophobia. This political trend became dominant in many European countries[iii]. Exploiting the fear of loosing a comfort-zone and security to the "invasion of barbarians", many of the economically formulated immigration laws were

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[i] Agamben, Symposium, 1995; pp 3
[ii] See *The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU* by Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers (2007 Editorial Board of *Antipode*.)
[iii] See *Citizenship and the Biopolitics of Post-Nationalist Ireland* by John A. Harrington (Journal of Law and Society; Vol. 32, Nr.3; Sept. 2005; 424-49)

easily passed. The old colonial image of enlightened European culture and an external world of chaos and darkness is purposefully revived, confirming the fact of exclusory policies embedded in civic nationalism.

Marx analysis of nationalism affirms this political thinking by establishing the historical continuity of the same logic of power. Both Schmitt's and Agamben's claims reflect the underlying power-structure sustained in modern nation-state. Hence, Marx's view on nationalism seems to be historical recasting of their political views.

Furthermore, Schmitt spared no efforts defending the classical conception of sovereignty against the liberalistic attempts to dilute it by dissolving the political. In his political existentialism, the political represents readiness to fight against the enemy. Since as we saw, the enemy is always the public enemy, (enemy can only be encountered by political entity, not individually), then the political was what made the group into a political entity. This picture of inherent bellicosity as the precondition for the political did not suit the liberal project of minimising sovereign power. Once the absolute political power of monarchs was diminished and dispersed through a number of institutions, the political had to disappear. Hence, in the political theory of liberalism, civic nationalism received its support through the *negation of the political.* That is, the political was negated by denying that the exclusory policies were a part of nationalism.

This was done by insisting on the theoretical distinction between two essentially different forms of nationalism, and by making historical reinterpretations that accorded with such theoretical distinctions. Marx observes that the imposition of this conceptual dichotomy was a part of the political project of liberal democracy, which is a historico-political counterpart of the liberalistic denial of the political and the classical conception of sovereignty. It is the response of liberalism to counterhistory.

How did this theoretical distinction gain a popular support among historians? Marx's answer lies partly in the simple fact that the exclusive cohesion in politics is matched in history writing by *selective amnesia*. Selective amnesia is interpretative praxis that serves to reinforce its theoretic correlate - civic/ethnic distinction. This distinction in turn determines interpretative praxis, and represents what Foucault denoted as the regime of truth. They are locked together creating the appearance of complete hermeneutical circles. Thus, the impression of inclusive character of nationalism consisted in the falsification of history, in the paradox of

intentional forgetfulness[i]. All bloodsheds that preceded the creation of nation were purposefully removed from the collective memory reaffirming discretely the theoretical distinction. This is, according to Marx, a part of the explanation why exclusory policies were in the theory of nationalism relegated to mere lags and divergences from the "true" idea of nation embedding the principle of inclusion. The regime of truth created by theorists of western style nationalism does not seem to leave the room for an analysis of nationalism that was not in line with ongoing political projects – creation of nation. Thus, the backside of this praxis is the political struggle being fought on different fronts while serving the same ends, which is tantamount to saying that that political theory, just like history, never really freed itself from politics. This seems to be Marx's contention in any case.

What is more, considered in ethical terms, inclusiveness of civic nationalism appears much more attractive comparing to exclusory policies. It is in accordance with the liberalistic conception of freedom and equality. In praxis, this means that the idea of civic nationalism, thanks to its strong appeal, is much easier to sell. Recalling what Foucault said about the role of norm for the solidification of power it is easy to see how theory of nationalism operating on normative reasons (accorded with popular ethical beliefs) becomes more productive in terms of securing loyalty and cohesion. This is perhaps the main reason, according to Marx, why various theorists have favoured the civic nationalism.

From this juxtaposition, it follows that on Marx's view, nationalism depicts the political process, which naturally leads to the conception of sovereignty and of the political as espoused by Schmitt and Agamben. Both processes are explicable in terms of Foucauldian concept of power. Nationalism has carried the positive power over to politics and to the conception of modern nation-state with its corresponding concept of sovereignty – exclusory cohesion transcribed in exclusory inclusion. Red backwards, he seems to have applied the categories of political theory to his analysis of nationalism.

One may object that this does not validate his theory of nationalism. Using the same perspective (the same concept of power) in the sphere of political theory and jurisprudence (sovereignty, citizenship, rights, legal status of citizen) does prove

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[i] On page thirty, Marx gives historical examples (dating back to the era of monarchy) of ruling elites orchestrating policies of intentional forgetfulness by officially banning revival of the memory of earlier conflicts

potency of this interpretative method, and reflects the scope of its application, but this does not necessarily entail its validity.

Another way to object is, as hinted earlier, to point that Schmitt's use of Foucauldian concept of power is visible only in retrospect. If it is present at all in Schmitt's writing, it is so only implicitly and vaguely. To claim otherwise may seem as a rude imposition of Foucauldian perspective on Schmitt's political thinking. Schmitt, after all, was a defender of the classical concept of sovereignty. He had simply taken for granted that the political entity referred to in his writings is modern nation-state.

However, by expressing his worries regarding a possible danger political entity can face (domestic disturbance, danger of political fracturing, deterioration of inner cohesion), Schmitt seems to have implicitly assumed the biopolitical concerns as pertaining to the political. To an extent this is true; it is reasonable to say that the biopolitical concerns do underscore his views as to why sovereignty is desired and why it is a prerequisite to have power at all. Hence, even though Schmitt is not explicitly dwelling on the concept of power, his political thought can be placed in natural continuation of nationalism as espoused by Marx. The political is what nationalism has intended by intending the sate (see Marx's definition of nationalism, page 74). The difference between the civic and the ethnic nationalism reflects the difference in the manner power is linked to the political. This in turn is determined by how power was understood and what power strategies were deployed. In this way, the link between Marx and Schmitt can be established through Foucault. To be sure, this is not a historical link, but a link in virtue of the tradition, which is based on similar standpoints supplementing each other in different but interconnected areas of investigation.

Another objection may be that Foucault's concept of power is misused or used conveniently in Marx's analysis. Reflecting back on the distinction between the ethic and the civic nationalism, the latter received its articulated form only when, as Foucault observed, understanding of power has changed. When power "became creative", it turned into biopower, marking the switch in temporal perspective. The temporal perspective affected the justification of (use of) power. It is the outcome that justifies the use of power, not the past (tradition). Classical power, (sovereignty) by contrast, looks for its justification in the past. Recall that the same point Foucault observed regarding the temporal perspective used by historians defending absolutism.

Now, biopower in its creative enterprise is a characteristic of civic nationalism. Classical power, resting on ancestry (past) is a characteristic of ethnic nationalism. This fact reflects the difference between these two forms of nationalism. The ethnic nationalism is backward looking – it looks at the ancestry, kinships, it defines political legitimacy in terms of priority of birth. The civic nationalism, in contrast, is forward looking – it is essentially biopolitical. The inclusiveness is its (bio)political goal. Hence, on the surface the problem for Marx is that he uses a future-oriented concept of power to argue that it is at work in a backward looking nationalism.

However, the problem may exist only on the surface. The positive concept of power does not contradict exclusory policies. Contradiction emerges only if dichotomous distinctions between the ethnic and the civic nationalism is maintained. The source of seeming contradiction lies in equating exclusory policies with the ethnic nationalism, while insisting that these are not a part of the civic nationalism.

Thus, Foucault's positive concept of power is compatible with both exclusory and inclusive policies. Persecution, violence, expulsion and utilisation of past and ethnicity to provide political legitimacy are no less creative and forward oriented than health care and use of the abortion to eliminate degeneracy. Both serve the maximisation of power, and accord with the logic of power. Indeed, one can say that the ethnic nationalism is closer fit to the clam that true power arises from basic power-relation. Blood bonds, kinship, linguistic familiarity, religious unity, feeling of solidarity and xenophobic zeal, all of them operate at the basic level - something that is not the case with the civic nationalism, which is the result of efforts made by elites.

John Gledhill, who criticised Gellner and Anderson for not providing an adequate explanation of why copycatting of East European intellectuals resulted in the ethic rather than the civic nationalism (the one they were supposed to be copycatting), offered an explanation in exactly Foucauldian terms. He treated exclusively the Rumanian case, but it could easily be applied to other cases on the Balkans, otherwise problematic for both Gellner and Anderson. According to him, there is no doubt that ideas of nationalism spread eastwards, but by the time they reached the rebellious movements in the east, Johann Gottfried Herder's ideas of nationhood had far greater influence than those of Rousseau. In the absence of other preconditions (capitalism and print), the principle of ethnicity seemed much more suitable for local elites to gain political legitimacy, which was the first step toward the independence from the

Ottomans and the Habsburgs. These nationalistic efforts in building nation-states took place some thirty to forty years after the French Revolution. By then, the concept of power underwent abovementioned change, and in the context of nation-building, the biopower began to play a dominant role. The task of the ruling elites of the nascent nations was to bolster the life in the limiting context of ethnicity. Myths of common ancestry and common roots, sense of uniqueness, historical continuity and linguistic distinctiveness were inscribed in what Foucault termed "infinitesimal level of power-relations". The national cohesion grew out of family bonds, that is, the family bonds were encoded in the feeling of national membership. Nation was conceived as *family writ large*, as the logical extension of family that grows bigger, while retaining its cultural, linguistic and blood ties. The biopolitical concerns were codified in terms of ethnicity stressing the importance of keeping this basic cohesive principle intact and vital. Hence, the application of biopower in an ethnic context produced the ethnic nationalism, which hundred years later turned out to be very exclusive. It is clear on this account (as on Marx's) that biopower is not incongruent with exclusory policies. Power does not submit to the soundness of the political or the ethical idea on which it works. It always strives to maximise itself, and in the process, it may take different approaches.

Marx's Foucauldian interpretation

Foucault revealed in his analysis the change form a classical to a modern concept of power in terms of change from prohibitory to creative power. He observed how power works by producing itself out of basic power-relations. This implies that when tracing the process of power-maximisation one is moving upwards - form the bottom (basic power-relations) to the top (power-strategies deployed by ruling elites). Inasmuch as the process is determined by strategies and techniques, it is controllable, but power often "works in mysterious ways", escaping the initial intention.

Marx's analysis of nationalism works under the same premises. He was able to identify both the micro level (English religious zealot) and the macro level (Inquisition) and the intermediate stages containing both aspects (France). Biopolitical concerns were not yet fully developed and articulated during the 16th and the 17th century, but exclusory policies pursued undoubtedly moved in this direction In England, just as in France, power solidified itself on the micro-level. The difference is that

England did not deploy strategies in the same way France did, but the outcome in both cases was unpredictable. Henry VIII, when converting to Protestantism, could not predict, nor had he wished for the regicide. The Ferocity and the proportion of religious killings started by St. Bartholomew Day also surprised French elites. In both cases, the outcome was not contained in the initial intention.

Likewise, Foucault wrote about power operating through a medium, which is a concept, and power-strategy consisted in the conceptual shifts. It consisted in imposing new paradigms for historical interpretations, new regime of truth and new perspectives. Falsification of history, selective amnesia, and the denial of the political can on Marx's account be viewed as a part of the very same strategy. The theoretical distinction between the civic and the ethnic nationalism in terms of inclusiveness and exclusiveness is likewise a strategic move of imposing a new perspective on history. This view echoes many of Foucault's observations regarding the importance of knowledge, its equation with power, regime of truth and conceptual shift. Marx identified religion as the most important medium of power in early stages. He stressed the need to politicise religion by territorializing it and augmenting intolerance. Seen in this way, the politicalisation of religion is the conceptual shift performed on religion.

Marx's analysis then provides an explanation of nationalism in terms of power. Nationalism, on this account turns out to be a strategy or a power technique. We are here presented with the picture of nationalism that may easily be applicable to all cases insofar the power is an issue. That is, various nationalistic movements differing in outlook were essentially the same power-technique applied under the different circumstances. The difference in the circumstance explains the historical evidence that nationalistic movements differed in the degree of inclusiveness and exclusivity.

Nationalism as power – difficulties in Marx's analysis

Nationalism, especially in modern debates, is negatively connoted. It is equated with the intolerance and exclusory practices, and generally with a sort of narrow-mindedness. Much of this is true. The Eagerness and the zealot with which a nationalist commits to the national cause is recognised by many as his most peculiar trait. Likewise, the strength of nationalism is precisely its ability to generate a passionate commitment. However, actions motivated by passion are commonly

rendered irrational. Recalling our discussion about rationality of power (see 1.10; page 28) it seems that Marx's analysis adds a deeper rational dimension to this irrationality. By ascribing to these actions a deeper psychological meaning and an instrumental value, it makes them intelligible and rational. This is reflected in his thesis that the exclusory practices are the essential ingredient of nationalism, whichever form it claims to have.

The questions are then: Is nationalism rational? Is the political project of securing allegiance understandable in terms of the rationality of power? Are KZ camps rational? Or Guantanamo? Were there not any irrationalities in executing nationalistic policies? If there were, how could they be explained in terms of rationality of power? Well, if the success and the efficiency are criteria of rationality, and if the action targeting power is rational if it produces solidification of power, then it seems that St. Bartholomew, reservations, camps, ghettos, etc. are indeed rational.

This, however, clearly contradicts the popular ethical views, especially the one defended by Kant which is based on moral laws and rationality. Kant himself distinguished two types of rationality – the categorical one applicable to moral laws, and the instrumental one. The latter is central to power and to politics – it is power-rationality. Power-rationality is ethically blind in the sense that power in its working is not restrained by morality. Power is aware of the ethical norm and of the norm in general, but only in terms of power. That is, it is ware of the power of the norm. What is the relation between these two rationalities? What is the relation between the ethical norm and the "power-norm"? It seems that the relation is the one of power. Contrary to what Kant has claimed, instrumental rationality relative to a goal is a higher form of rationality, and consequently, the ethical norm is subordinate to power-norm. One can of course wonder whether even on the premise of power-rationality the dispensability of ethical demands leads to "truly" true power.

This order of priorities means that nationalism is not only explicable, but also argued for independently of the ethical norms. This suggests that the nation-state does not have to incorporate ethical values beyond the point at which they are no longer power-functional. At the extreme end, this may red as saying that the ethical values defended in the historical context of nationalism function apologetically of nationalism.

Turning irrationality into rationality has in addition to the ethical difficulty also the theoretical one. It seems that everything on this account can fit the theory making it resilient to falsification. But theory should beware of explaining too much. Or

one may object that the theory provides a sort of functional explanation, which is rather circular – everything is as it is because it is power- functional. Both tolerance and intolerance are rational, because they are power-functional. Does this mean that nationalism is reduced to power operations, and that we may not even know what it is? Is it not thereby dissolved to a kind of algorithmic operation on inputs and outputs, without any distinctive character?

Well, I think that neither Marx's nor Foucault's account are so trivialising. I believe that looking through the concept of power we got better understanding of nationalism. None of the mentioned analysts had doubts regarding the genus and the species of nationalism. All recognise the conceptual kinship of phenomena termed civic and ethnic nationalism respectively. What Marx's Foucauldian interpretation tried to do is to uncover the nature of this kinship, and to do away with the praxis of explaining nationalism in terms of genuine and deviant forms. This is achieved by looking at nationalism from the perspective of power.

Nationalism is not thereby reduced to power. Had it been so, it would be impossible to distinguish it from a revolution or a crusade e.g. Nationalism on Marx's account, is a distinctive category inseparable from its broader cultural and historical environment. It does not exit outside a particular constellation of ideas and material conditions. Considering nationalism as a political project of intensifying political power only makes it easier to see changes in policies due to the changes in understanding power. Biopolitic provided one such conceptual frame with a qualitatively different concept of power. It thereby added a new dimension to modern and consolidated form of nationalism, changing (broadening perhaps) the area of its concern.

Another charge may be that if the political struggle is fought on ideological grounds, then every interpretative praxis (Marx included) serves the ideological purpose. How can we then distinguish political theory from politics, and history from politics? If we cannot, then we run the risk of trivialising any claim to truth, since it can always be traced back to a political strategy, an interest, an agenda etc. One may try to find firm footing outside the social context in order to validate the theoretical claims and more importantly the ethical claims. But this is exactly what one cannot do. Should we perhaps give up the idea of truth and settle for less – perhaps the will to truth - as both Nietzsche and Foucault did? Well, no doubt that the issue is complex and intriguing, but it exceeds the ambition of this study.

Final remarks

Let me recapitulate what has been said in this study. Proceeding from the positive concept of power delivered by Foucault, I first tried to show which instrumental and epistemological reasons lay behind the acceptance of this conception. Epistemological reasons refer to the deployment of the positive concept of power as the grid of intelligibility. It is the interpretative approach applicable to a historical analysis, which focuses on nationalism. Instrumental reasons are those conscious applications of the positive concept of power, the deployments of power strategies and techniques, which the historical interpretation has to identify in their historical actuality. I showed how Foucault applied it in his treatment of the rise of nationalism, and later I presented different views on nationalism in order to inquire about their validity.

The goal was to try to grasp the phenomena of nationalism in its totality, and the positive concept of power provided an alternative approach to those more traditional taken by Anderson and Gellner. In addition to finding out what nationalism is, the goal was also to try to asses the methods employed by these different approaches. The assessment rests on the theoretical reflection of the method, and not on the historical investigation. I pointed to the inadequacy of Anderson's and Gellner's accounts, and Marx's Foucauldian analysis offered the remedy for their ailments. Still, the approach taken by Marx is far from free of theoretical difficulties.

Have we learned anything from all this? First, it turns out that nationalism is indeed a complex phenomenon, and every attempt to simplify it may leave us with a rather distorted picture. Thus, Marx's account, which conceives of nationalism as the power-strategy, tends to reduce nationalism to power operations, and thereby to erase its phenomenal identity. Thus, the danger of this method is that it threatens to dissolve rather than to solve the problem of nationalism.

Second, Anderson's and Gellner's accounts may seem preferable because they operate with a rather firmly fixed hypothesis representing recognisable theoretical foundation that can be further expanded in order to accommodate a variety of related phenomena. This seems to be absent from the account resting heavily on the dynamism of power, at least as long as we fail to fix the main explanatory principle – the power.

On the other hand, the major disadvantage of traditional views, which does not belie Marx's account, is precisely the absence of instrumentality. This may

sound confusing, but think of the difference in terms of the temporal directedness of the explanation. Even though both Anderson and Gellner identified causal links leading to nationalism, they never explained how and why the causation took place. That is, we have never learned whether nationalism denotes the process, and if it does, what keeps it going. This is actually reflected in the inability of their explanation to say why sometimes there was no causation even though all previously identified causal elements were at place, and why sometimes the causation took place in the absence of the basic elements. They actually pointed to the role of power in their explanations, but never really make it the principle that effectuated passage from one causal element to the other. Hence, although we may learn from their account how nationalism emerged in England or France, we may still not know what to make of it and what to expect form it. The knowledge from their accounts does not have the instrumental value of dealing with similar phenomena today.

This difficulty does not originate in Marx's account. Marx's Foucauldian account by identifying basic power operations and the medium can be a valuable tool in dealing with current socio-political tendencies and transformations. This knowledge can be used to understand the different outlooks and significance of nationalism in contemporary context. It implies a sort of indeterminateness of nationalism, but that may not be the shortcoming of the explanation or lack of understanding.

Furthermore, by thinking about nationalism in terms of power one gets the impression that one is presented with a rather mechanical picture of historical development. Is Marx's Foucauldian interpretation a case of (for) historicism? Does the rationality (metaphysics) of power imply that social and political changes follows certain laws and that history unfolds in patterns laid down by these laws? Are outputs (nation-states) necessitated by input (circumstances) plus power rationality?

The rationality of power seems to pose a different type of necessity, which does not hypothesise the existence of natural law governing history. It retains the necessity in regard to the workings of power but it remains indeterminate as regards the final outcome of an event or a process. In the case of nationalism, it shows how alliances are formed following the inner necessity, but the outcome does not have to be the same in each case. This is what Foucault referred to as "indefiniteness of history".

We may be allowed to say that nationalism refers to the process whereby forces are aligned and grouped within a society, constituting the cohesive forces

keeping it together. The notion of power explains why this process does not necessarily follows the trajectory of a political idea or ideology, as the civic nationalism would suggest. The dynamism of power working through nationalism permits the formation of power alliances centering on different lines of aligning such as ethnic or religious.

In the end, I may say that despite the attractiveness of Anderson's and Gellner's views, I have more sympathy for the Marx's account for the reasons that it has instrumental value. I do believe that nationalism does posses certain essential features; a cluster of properties that cannot be detached from it without the fear of losing it altogether. Still, I believe that some of these properties can be absent, and that their arrangement can be altered without thereby losing the phenomenon out of sight. Treating nationalism as a power-strategy helps to explain how these properties relate to each other. This means that by tracing the dynamism of power-operations and transformations in the use of power it becomes possible to understand different forms of nationalism, the transformations nation-states undergo at the moment, changes in political thought that accompany it etc.

The insistence on the civic/ethnic division in terms of genuine and deviant forms is an unhappy solution neglecting the immediate pressing reality of nationalism. It is also an unsatisfactory theoretical solution since it accords nationalism neither with the related political practices nor with the development in contemporary political thought. I tried to show this by indicating the similarity of Marx's view with that of Schmitt, and more particularly of Agamben. The political dimension of nationalism is "the cluster properties" of nationalism, and the approach which takes its cue from the concept of power explains how these properties change, how political thinking links nationalism with the political practices. It also explains in my view how nationalism is transformed form the historical event into the ongoing political project. Such an approach creates the opportunity to grasp nationalism in its aliveness; that is, to access it not as a historical monument, a sort of relic, but as the phenomenon that has dominated political landscape of the past few centuries.

Thus, my argument can be summed up as follows. Nationalism has cluster of determinative properties - historical circumstances in which it originated, socio-political transformations that made it possible. Part of these properties is its politico-theoretical marker – its link with political thought (sovereignty, citizenship, right, statehood etc.). The initial arrangement of these properties provides the prototype of

nationalism, but the subsequent development did not conform to it. The rise of biopolitics exemplified one possible rearrangement. Thus, in order to understand what possible arrangements cluster properties can assume it is necessary to understand the dynamics of their relationship. The understanding of this dynamism can benefit from adopting the positive concept of power and treating nationalism as power-strategy.

Finally, the reader may wonder that while it has often been emphasised that power works through norms, still there was no exclusive treatment of the ethical background of nationalism as a political doctrine. Is there any such background? Does nationalism understood as power strategy needs independent ethical arguments in its favour? The question touches upon the issue of whether the political theory needs the ethical theory in order to formulate its object. There are ways to go about this issue. Part of the answer has already been given in the 1.9 and 1.10.

Another, perhaps more interesting approach would be to apply Foucault's apparatus in order to critically investigate whether renown ethical standpoints in moral and political philosophy reflect an underlying, perhaps hidden, political agenda. A question could be formulated as to what extent it is plausible to claim that for instance Habermas' *Discourse Ethic* or Rawls' *Political Liberalism* are part of an overall strategic ideologisation, without committing oneself to a trivialised "conspiracy theory" type of claim. This would require not only to point to the commensurability of their views with popular democratic establishment (this would be too easy), but also to say which political goals (if any) they strive to realise within the democratic society.

In my opinion, however, the most interesting investigation would have to direct its attention towards the dynamism of inter-discursive praxis that has been taking place at an increasing rate in past decades. We witness how scientific discourses modify our understanding of the world (physical and social) constantly requiring revision of many of our ethical views. Think of the relation of genome research to bioethic and of technology to environmentalism. In the same manner, one may inquire about how certain social transformations modify our understanding of the political realm causing subsequent revision of our ethical and political modes of apprehension. The inquiry would have to uncover which place ethical reflections occupy within the realm of the political, and to which extent the ethical can preserve its autonomy. However, whichever path one chooses, the comprehensive study of the relation of ethics to power deserves separate treatment.

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